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Surrounding the turn of the 21st century, America’s private sector increased engagement 
with environmental and social issues through a growing number of corporate responsibility 
efforts and non-traditional, purpose-driven business models. The market drive for impact 
represented a changing landscape shaped by formal regulations, sociocultural norms, and social 
activism, which created legitimacy imperatives for firms. Guided by neo-institutional theory, I 
explored the influence of these external forces on non-traditional and traditional organizations 
using the United States apparel industry as a case study. Specifically, I researched apparel 
brands’ evolution of legitimacy strategies regarding social and environmental impact from 2005 
to 2020. With an original dataset of 498 brands and over 7,000 web pages, my inductive text 
analysis reveals a discursive framework of 8 rhetorical topics (Environmental Impact, Social 
Impact, Workers, Philanthropy, Causes, Impact Organizations & Partners, Certifications & 
Audits, and Business/Industry). I conclude that traditional and non-traditional brands’ 
legitimization strategies differed by reflecting their respective isomorphic pressures. I expand on 
this with a contextual discussion of the primary social and regulatory forces that influenced 
brands’ impact-related rhetoric. 
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The inspiration for this research was an observation of decreasing public confidence in 
civic sector projects and effectiveness over the past several decades. In a 2019 Pew Research 
poll, 75% of Americans indicated declining levels of trust in the government and elected officials 
(Rainie and Perrin). Citizens have increasingly turned to the private sector for solutions to public 
problems. From firm-targeted protests, petitions, and social media campaigns, consumers are 
using their voices to increase corporate responsibility. Simultaneously, social entrepreneurship 
and non-profit numbers have grown as the landscape of social and environmental innovation has 
flourished from sizeable corporate philanthropic donations and impact investing (Henderson 
2020; Giridharadas 2018). Through this study, I provide a better understanding of how 
organizations have adapted to these changes by examining their communication strategies.  
Across the private sector, there are innumerable industry-specific risks and drivers related 
to social and environmental responsibility, which prompted me to narrow my research scope to a 
case study of the apparel industry. Why? Clothing companies and brands have been prominently 
contested for their manufacturing processes, pollutants, and treatment of workers. The industry is 
responsible for up to 10% of all global emissions and benefits from power imbalances to exploit 
workers in developing nations (The World Bank 2019; The True Cost 2015). In response to this 
knowledge, social movements and legislation have targeted some of apparel’s biggest brand 
names first when fighting against sweatshop conditions, irresponsible factory pollution, and non-
transparent production processes. Such activism in the United States started with the industrial 
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revolution and has re-emerged surrounding the turn of the 21st century, mainly in the 1990s 
(White 2017). Because brands live in a consumer-driven market, they rely on a positive image 
and reputation to stay competitive. Apparel brands frequent interactions with customers, 
environmentalists, social activists, and industry-wide standards organizations makes their public-
facing rhetoric a convincing source to study virtue-signalling strategies.    
I began my research by situating the apparel industry within the larger context of 
increased corporate social responsibility (CSR), which provides initial insight to how traditional 
businesses have positioned themselves in the public sphere. CSR is generally defined as 
activities performed by businesses to contribute to their social, philanthropic, activist, charitable, 
or ethical-practice goals (Latapi Agudeloet al 2019; Sahlin-Andersson 2006). This modern 
understanding of CSR arose in the American context starting in the 1950s, but rapidly 
transformed in the 1970s due to an economic recession, anti-war sentiments, and emergent 
government institutions such as the Environmental Protection Agency (Latapi Agudelo et al 
2019). Civic and legal actions sent a message to businesses that they were, in some part, 
responsible for their impact on the earth and its inhabitants. Pressure continued through the 
1980s as President Reagan’s leadership sparked a “conservative revolution” that turned to the 
market as opposed to policy-driven efforts to create social and environmental solutions 
(Lounsbury and Sang 2009). The 1990s followed suit as President Clinton advanced ideas of 
“good corporate citizenship” and John Elkington, a worldwide authority on CSR and 
sustainability, coined the term “triple bottom line” which equally prioritized people, planet, and 
profits (Carroll 1997; Elkington 1994). With a strong economy and “win-win-win" perspective, 
companies began to see CSR as more than a moral obligation, but a strategic business investment 
and risk management tactic.   
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In 2005, the meaning of CSR shifted and solidified when Werther and Chandler began 
using the term: Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (SCSR) (2005). Harvard Business 
Review disseminated the SCSR term as an effective business strategy where “everybody wins,” 
especially the corporation. Once responsibility became strategic for corporations, it also 
increased in competitiveness for recognition. Now, in order to be seen favorably in the eyes of 
shareholders, consumers, and the public, corporations compete for respect through their SCSR 
efforts (Chandler and Werther 2013; Chandler 2016). This strategic implementation and cause-
related marketing has only multiplied in recent years in response to the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals, which are directing a course of action for many corporations through 2030 
(United Nations). 
Isolated from albeit connected to CSR, is a for-profit sector that has positioned itself as 
finding particularly innovative social solutions. Here we find the social enterprise “movement” 
that began to take root in the 1980s (Lounsbury and Lee 2004). By the 1990s, the idea of social 
enterprise became solidified through national network organizations and alliances (Social 
Enterprise Alliance, REDF, Ashoka, Acumen, and the Skoll Foundation, to name a few). 
Furthermore, it gained legitimacy through academia as many university programs began teaching 
social enterprise courses or social innovation methods (Lounsbury and Sang 2009). Despite these 
advancements, social enterprise remains weakly defined. At best, social enterprises are 
recognized as organizations intended to solve or address a social or environmental issue through 
a market-driven approach (Sparviero 2019). This definition leaves a lot of room for interpretation 
given the vast range of business models and industries involved. Academics also lack a shared 
understanding of social enterprise, and its many iterations have left it “pre-paradigmatic in the 
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Kuhnian sense” (Nicholls 2010). Without a distinct definition in place, I see this as an 
opportunity to contribute to the discussion of responsible business and institutions. 
Hence, for the purposes of my study I refer to apparel brands as either “traditional” or 
“non-traditional,” which aligns with common management studies terms. I consider this 
distinction to be a fixed trait based on each brand’s foundational purpose or initial value 
proposition. The classification of traditional and non-traditional is also independent of any true 
or measurable environmental or social impact. For example, a company that started with 
traditional goals and business practices may have CSR programs exhibiting increasingly 
sustainable or socially progressive tendencies over time. However, their progress indicates an 
evolution driven by contextual pressures and opportunities, not an initial embedded structure. 
Additionally, I use the neutral term “non-traditional” as opposed to “ethical,” “sustainable,” or 
“progressive” in order to encapsulate the various ways that brands can make positive 
commitments to society (for example, some apparel brands focus on workers’ wages while 
others focus on the environment by using recycled materials).  
In the following sections, I draw from neo-institutional and organizational evolution 
literatures to frame the goal of this paper in identifying brand-level discursive legitimacy 
strategies. Throughout, I show how the United States apparel industry is a case selection with 
abundant content to study how brands’ rhetorical strategies reflect their environment. Primarily, I 
ask what themes can be found in brands’ rhetorical evolution and whether non-traditional brands 
are influencing traditional brands to demonstrate higher levels of responsibility. Through a 
discussion of the data collection, analysis, and findings, the contribution of this research serves 
as a legacy for future studies in organizational sociology relating to environmental and social 
impact in business.  
   
 






I employ neo-institutional theory (NIT) to understand how traditional and non-traditional 
apparel brands have rhetorically positioned themselves in response to institutional and societal 
pressures to act responsibly and sustainably. Originating in the late 1970s, neo-institutional 
theory is applied to help explain the behavior of organizations within their macro-level social 
contexts and institutional systems (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Lounsbury and Zhao 2013). 
Scholars in the field emphasize how such societal norms and regulatory agencies create a 
“legitimacy imperative” that results in organizational responses (Scott 2008). In a competitive 
capitalist framework, the legitimacy imperative forces organizations to adapt in order to survive, 
consequently shaping organizational evolution patterns within entire populations (Aldrich, Ruef, 
Lippmann 2020; Carrol 1997; Nadkarni and Narayanan 2007). Studying organizations’ strategic 
behaviour and communications, for example, can indicate how organizations interact with their 
world and each other in changing environments.  
Many factors are involved in an organization’s influential environment, but several are 
mentioned frequently in relevant literature: (1) sociocultural contexts, (2) social activism, and (3) 
formal regulations. First, sociocultural rules and beliefs are prominently embedded in an 
organization’s larger context (Scott 2008). Meyer and Rowan call these mores “rational myths” 
because of how they invisibly control what practices and behaviors are expected or appropriate 
in a given society (1977). Second, social activism can pressure institutions and corporations to 
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adopt new regulations or retire unpopular activities (Lounsbury 2001). Third, formal laws and 
regulations bind organizations, which may directly explain their behavior or force them to 
change (Lounsbury and Zhao 2013). By conforming to rational myths, social activism, and 
formal regulations, organizations work to gain respect and legitimacy. I now expand further on 
these three influential factors to inform how they affect the apparel industry specifically. 
Sociocultural Contexts 
First, cultural norms resulting from a public interest in the impact of clothing has led to 
increased favor of responsible production processes and growing concerns over climate change 
and fair wages. According to Google Trends, which tracks search term frequencies over time, 
“sustainable fashion” steadily rose from 2013 to 2020, after a brief peak in 2004 (Appendix 1, 
Figure 1.2). Sustainable fashion’s contrasting term, “fast fashion,” describes the speedy cycle of 
clothing styles that results in overproduction; its search rate peaked in 2020 after consistent 
growth (Appendix 1, Figure 1.1). Despite the economic appeal of fast and cheap apparel, a 
growing minority of consumers “are willing to pay” a higher price for ethical and sustainable 
products (Hustvedt and Bernard 2010; Park 2018). Additionally, phrases like “vote with your 
wallet” have been employed by activists and organizations to encourage consumers to support 
causes they care about by shopping from certified B Corps, which are businesses that have 
demonstrated a measurable impact of positive social and environmental practices (Gehman, 
Grimes, Cao 2018). Overall, the rational myth of conscious consumerism has created a social 
and financial incentive for apparel brands to react to their changing environment in order to 
maintain a positive reputation and win over shoppers in a competitive market (Bartley and Child 
2014; Vasi and King 2012).  
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Social Activism 
Second, social movements and activists have targeted the apparel industry’s domestic and 
international labor practices and impact on the environment for over a century (Appendix 1, 
Table 1.1). In the mid to late 1990s, there was a flux of anti-sweatshop protests that disrupted the 
apparel industry by targeting brands like Nike, Gap, and Liz Claiborne (Bartley and Child 2011). 
As a result of the intense campaigns, brands’ sales and stock prices dropped, CSR ratings 
declined, and their public reputation was stained, leading to the implementation of new vendor 
codes of conduct and considerable public relations efforts to control the damage (Bartley and 
Child 2011). Decades later, a new wave of social activism was sparked by the April 2013 Rana 
Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, which killed over 1,000 garment workers (The True Cost 
2015). The disaster inspired the formation of international non-profits such as Fashion 
Revolution and Remake, which organize consumers to protest, petition, and spread social media 
campaigns against fast fashion pollution and working conditions (Appendix 1, Table 1.1). While 
little research has been published on this event’s impact on the apparel industry, how other 
industries have responded to similar environmental and social pressures serves as a template. 
For instance, firms have been found to respond to social movement activism and negative 
media attention via formal structural changes, such as the adoption of a corporate social 
responsibility committee, and increased transparency through social responsibility reports or 
revealing internal operations (McDonnell et al 2015; White 2017). Furthermore, Bartley and 
Child showed that when the largest and most well-known brands were targeted by activists, a 
trickle-down effect occurred where smaller companies adapted in similar ways to remain 
competitive (2014). Overall, these studies demonstrate how social activism can lead to industry 
evolution and increased CSR implementation.  
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Formal Regulations 
Finally, formal laws and regulations have significantly impacted the apparel industry over 
time. Of course, the implementation of new policies is often the result of cultural trends and 
successful social movements, but unlike the “rational myths” of social influence, there are 
immediate and tangible consequences for organizations that do not abide by them (Sutton et al 
1994). Therefore, legal restraints create a legitimacy imperative for the apparel industry that calls 
for a detailed review (Scott 2008). As such, I created a full timeline of important events and 
formal regulatory pressures placed on the apparel industry since 1911 (Appendix 1, Table 1.1). 
Here, I highlight and anticipate some of the more influential events and institutions with the 
power to influence brands manufacturing and marketing practices.  
First, I review the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) which was established in September 
1914. In relation to the apparel industry, the FTC has passed several acts to regulate material 
labelling and safety, such as the Wool Products Labelling Act (1939), Fur Products Labelling 
Act (1952), Flammable Fabrics Act (1954), and Textile Fiber Identification Act (1960) (FTC 
2020). In 1992, the FTC published their first version of “Green Guides” which monitor what 
sustainability claims can made by company marketing in an attempt to avoid lies and 
“greenwashing” (FTC 2012). A second influential institution is The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which was established in December 1970. The EPA has passed the Clean Water 
Act (1972) and Clean Air Act (1970) which put limits on manufacturing practices for all 
industries, including apparel. Third, the U.S. Department of Labor oversees the apparel 
industry’s domestic working conditions. Throughout the 1990s, the Department of Labor began 
intervening with sweatshops in the Los Angeles garment industry with support from the White 
House Apparel Industry Partnership (National Museum of American History). A fourth major 
   
 
 9  
 
influence occurred when California passed the 2012 Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which 
requires firms to disclose their ethical and sustainable supply chain efforts (Harris 2015). Finally, 
from an international perspective, the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (2015) 
and their Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action were created to achieve net-zero emissions 
in the apparel industry by 2050 (United Nations 2018).  
These events and enforcing bodies, alongside others in Appendix 1, contextualize my 
analysis of brands’ strategic messaging throughout previous decades. As institutional and legal 
expectations to protect workers and the environment have increased, they have created a 
regulatory environment and legitimacy imperative for apparel brands. Aligning with neo-
institutional theory, I expect brands to respond in a strategic and survivalist fashion. Next, I 
discuss specific ways firms have demonstrated such adaptation prior to my case study. 
Legitimization Strategies 
Organizations heavily pursue cognitive and/or sociopolitical legitimacy in their early and 
formative years (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). However, many organizations, especially in fast-paced 
industries like apparel, continue to legitimate themselves and adjust to new environments 
throughout their lifespan. An organization’s legitimization strategies change as they age, and the 
primary way legitimacy is established within an industry also changes over time. As I’ve 
recounted, firms are increasingly expected to demonstrate their impact on the environment and 
populations. However, legitimacy is now expected in quantifiable CSR reports, moving away 
from “talk” and good intentions towards a more standardized, measurable evaluation system 
(Barnett 2020; Schons and Steinmeier 2015; Ebrahim and Rangan 2014). So, while legitimacy 
may look different over time, place, and purpose, I expand specifically on consequential 
legitimacy to reflect the environmental and social concerns of this study.  
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Consequential legitimacy is a form of moral legitimacy that rests on ideas of contributing 
to the public good (Aldrich, Ruef, Lippmann 2020; Suchman 1995; Carroll 1993). To gain 
consequential legitimacy in the public eye, organizations must associate their cause with 
prevailing social values, as suggested by the rational myths of neo-institutional theory (Dowling 
and Pfeffer 1975). Interestingly, consequential legitimacy can be gained even without concrete 
evidence to support organizational claims of goodwill. For example, the perceived benefits of 
having an ethical brand identity have led to “greenwashing,” or the intentional misrepresentation 
of a firm’s environmental efforts (Nyilasy 2012). Nevertheless, most consumers can’t tell the 
difference between a true claim and a greenwashed one. In power-imbalanced, high-ambiguity 
settings with situations far-removed (such as manufacturing in a developing nation), 
consequential legitimacy claims serve primarily as virtuous signals of morality, not necessarily 
accurate portrayals (Carroll 1993). Because of this limitation, I use what apparel brands say, not 
what they do, as the basis for observing their legitimization techniques. 
I anticipate brands will enact several strategies that have been supported by previous 
literature: (1) discursive, (2) authority, (3) certification, and (4) isomorphism. First, discursive 
strategies permeate all forms of legitimization, as they are built upon sensemaking and rhetoric. 
There is a certain discourse available for different contexts, including the fashion industry, 
environmental efforts, and social responsibility. Existing discourses frame the way “people make 
sense of particular issues and give sense to them” (Vaara and Tienari 2008). Organizations can 
strongly establish and enact discourse because they are themselves “shared meaning structures 
that result from collective cognitions or shared understandings” (Suddaby and Seidl 2013). 
Apparel brands, as a collective institution, can thus create a norm of “doing good” through 
cause-related marketing. This type of marketing highlights a firm’s philanthropic social and 
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environmental efforts and is knowingly practiced by both traditional and non-traditional brands. 
The narratives they choose can strategically establish legitimacy, enhance brand image, grow 
brand awareness, evoke emotions, create community, and elicit engagement from audiences 
(Hoeffler and Keller 2002). Simultaneously, the chosen rhetoric for public-facing assertions 
constructs a discursive framework for consequential legitimacy within the industry.  
Second, authority figures and status signals can be used strategically to establish 
legitimacy. Often, the founder or leader of an organization will use their personal story or 
expertise to lend legitimacy to the organization itself. For instance, corporate representatives of a 
Finnish company responded to criticism by emphasizing their expertise through media outlets 
(Joutsenvirta and Vaara 2009). In new ventures or non-traditional, purpose-driven organizations, 
legitimacy often takes the form of entrepreneur’s personal identity and unique altruistic 
experiences, expertise, and passion to lead (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). This draws from 
Weber’s form of legitimate authority, in which leaders demonstrate a charismatic claim to power 
(Weber 1978). An example of this practice is seen through Toms Shoes, a non-traditional 
footwear brand that donates a pair of shoes for every pair purchased. Its founder, Blake 
Mycoskie, frequently recounts his travels in Argentina where he was moved by seeing children 
without shoes, a story that became his inspiration to start the company (Toms). By telling his 
story at speaking engagements and in his book, Start Something That Matters, he embodies the 
brand’s authoritative legitimacy. 
Third, attaining verified certifications from respected institutions is an effective 
legitimacy strategy. Much like a testimonial, having third-party validation makes a brands’ 
claims more believable. In the American automobile industry, for instance, repeated 
certifications and awards improved firms’ reputation status and increased their survival chances 
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(Rao 1994). Therefore, this legitimization technique is highly valuable for new or non-traditional 
firms, who do not have the existing status or reputation of a large corporation to help them 
survive. Smaller organizations may also gain community legitimacy through involvement with 
charitable registries, chamber of commerce endorsements, and local certifications (Carroll 1993; 
Grimes, Gehman, Cao 2018). In the apparel industry specifically, there are many standards 
boards, certification bodies, and trade associations that offer their “stamp of approval” for a 
brand’s ESG claims, such as the Fair Trade Federation, International Standards Organization, 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Better Cotton Initiative, Business of Fashion, Global 
Organic Textile Standards, and the Higg Index (Appendix 1, Table 1.1).  
Fourth, and most notably, isomorphism strategies were identified by neo-institutionalists 
as they learned that organizations become more homogenous over time (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Specifically, organizations will become similar and share certain 
traits in order to earn legitimacy and perceptions of belonging. As demonstrated by Deephouse’s 
study on banks, isomorphic conformity can enhance legitimacy with public audiences as well as 
industry-specific regulators (1996). Alternatively, Sharkey and Bromley found that when a firm 
had a collective presence of peers that have been rated by environmental standards, they were 
likely to change their pollution efforts and obtain a rating (2015). Therefore, when an 
organization is applauded or avoids criticism for certain strategic actions, other organizations in 
their industry have a strong desire and incentive to follow. 
Organizations can experience different types of isomorphic pressures which have been 
categorized as normative, coercive, and mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Normative 
pressures relate to social norms, shared beliefs, cultures, and even proximal geographies that 
encourage organizations to conform (Scott 2008; Marquis 2007). Coercive pressures describe 
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external factors previously discussed such as formal laws, regulations, and power structures that 
dictate organizational behavior. Finally, mimetic pressures “stem from conditions of uncertainty 
that trigger imitation of peers” (Lounsbury and Zhao 2013). For example, in an environment of 
anti-sweatshop protests, increased consumer interest in sustainability, and increased regulatory 
agencies, I consider the apparel industry to have faced with uncertainty. In such conditions, 
certain brands will have more success and a greater chance of survival based on their ability to 
adapt to their changing environment and to communicate their consequential legitimacy with 
stakeholders. 
Based on the contextual environment of the apparel industry between 1990 and 2020, 
there is reason to believe that brands have increased their virtue-signalling and discursive 
legitimacy strategies in order to adapt to increased external pressures from society, formal 
regulators, and industry competition. This informs my belief that non-traditional apparel brands 
can act as a mimetic force for traditional brands. Non-traditional brands’ strong and long-held 
connection to positive impact gives them an advantageous position in this environment. 
Therefore, non-traditional brands’ strategic messaging and production practices may have set an 
example for traditional brands to follow, leading them to make more virtuous claims in order to 
establish moral legitimacy and successfully adapt to the changing industry.   
   
 




QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
My review of literature surrounding emerging corporate social responsibility, neo-
institutional theory, and legitimization strategy prefaces how external forces contribute to 
ecological changes in the industry, such as showing concern for people and planet. More 
specifically, as the apparel industry has faced pressure from conscious consumers, anti-
sweatshop social activism, and regulations, they must adapt to survive and maintain a positive 
brand image. I theorize that this process of organizational adaptation and survival occurs (at least 
partially) within their discursive legitimacy strategies meant to capture consumer dollars and 
empathy, and that these claims can be found on their public-facing websites. Consequently, my 
research questions if and how traditional and non-traditional United States apparel brands have 
changed their rhetoric regarding social and environmental responsibility from 2005 to 2020. 
In order to examine relationships between traditional and non-traditional brands, I focus 
on the public-facing rhetoric on their website. Through text analysis, I define specific language, 
phrasing, and legitimacy-making techniques as “impact related terms” in order to identify 
similarities and differences between brand-types over time. I hypothesize the following: 
H1: Traditional apparel brand rhetoric will become more similar to non-traditional 
brands over time.  
H(a): The highest grossing traditional apparel brands will adapt first, followed 
by smaller and less profitable brands. 
I first verify my assumption that responsibility and virtue-signalling rhetoric increased over time, 
and that the conversation grew more certification-oriented to demonstrate legitimate impact. 
   
 
 15  
 
Then, I analyze whether non-traditional brands acted as a mimetic pressure in the industry by 
setting a precedent for traditional brands’ responsibility rhetoric, as suggested by the neo-
institutional theory of isomorphism. Based on prior research, I also anticipate that the well-
known or highest grossing traditional brands will increase their impact signalling first, while 
smaller traditional brands will follow in their footsteps after a time (Bartley and Child 2014). To 
support my analysis, I contextualize and discuss how external pressures may have induced 
brands to modify their practices and legitimize virtuous behavior, as theorized by neo-
institutionalism. 
  
   
 







In designing this research study, several decisions were made to limit and define the 
population. Apparel brands, as opposed to parent companies or retailers, were chosen as the level 
of analysis. There are many brand names owned by conglomerate firms; for example, VF 
Corporation in North Carolina owns The North Face, Vans, Dickies, Timberland, and more. 
However, each brand has its own website, persona, and rhetorical style. Because I am concerned 
with how apparel brands represent themselves to the public, the brand-level was essential, 
despite limitations to the quantity and quality of organizational data available. Second, the study 
was limited to brands owned and headquartered in the United States. This was designed to hold 
certain regulatory variables constant, such as industry codes, federal regulations, and the relative 
consumer base. This section outlines the brand and website data collection methods and brand 
summary statistics. 
Brand Data Collection 
Prior to sampling, I compiled an estimated population list of all apparel brands that 
existed at some point between 2005 and 2020 (N=5,167). These brand names were sourced from 
any location possible in an attempt to capture traditional, non-traditional, and less established 
brands. Some of the most fruitful sources were Wikipedia, Nexis Uni, Statista, Orbis Database, 
Walmart, Target, TJMaxx, Eco-Age, Re/make, B Corporation Directory, Fair Trade, Sustainable 
Apparel Coalition, and Fashion Revolution. When collected, each brand was categorized into 
one of three stratified sampling groups. First, the “Selected, Revenue” group composed of the 
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highest grossing and well-known brands. This stratum had a 100% probability of selection into 
the final sample (n=94), as the brands with the highest market share are important to study due to 
their influence. Second, the “Selected, Non-traditional” group included all known non-traditional 
brands, found primarily from ethical business and advocacy lists such as B Corporation or 
Fashion Revolution. This stratum also had a 100% probability of selection into the final sample 
(n=116) due to its importance to the study of responsibility rhetoric. Finally, the “Random” 
group consisted of brands that were neither top-grossing or sourced as non-traditional and had a 
5.5% probability of random selection into the final sample (n=288).1  
Once the initial list of brands was sampled, I began the data collection process with the 
help of a research assistant. We rejected any brands headquartered outside of the United States or 
that had an insufficient amount of information available online. The final sample size was n=498. 
Using brand websites, LinkedIn, Reference USA, Orbis, and general web searches, we collected 
“demographic” variables for each brand (See Appendix 2 for full descriptions and summary 
statistics). The overall intercoder reliability was .89 agreement, as tested by a 10% sample (n=50. 
The Cohen’s Kappa for the traditional vs. non-traditional brand identification variable was 
k=.81, an acceptable reliability (Glen, 2014).   
A brief synopsis2 of the sampled brands shows that non-traditional brands composed 
11.1% of the sample (n=126), however 25% of all brands had some form of social responsibility 
featured on their website in 2020. Most brands were headquartered in California (41%) or New 
York (25%). Men founded 61% of the brands, while 26% were founded by women, and 13% by 
 
1 Randomly sampled brands were weighted by 18.2 for descriptive statistics, but were not weighted in all other 
analyses because the webpages were not representatively sampled; this limits the generalizability of my data. 
 
2 Missing data were excluded from the composition calculations. 
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a combination of both genders. The median start date for a brand was 2002, with a range from 
1818 to 2020. Brands that were not owned by a parent company comprised 58% of the sample, 
while 42% were. In terms of stock, 13% of brands (or their parent company) were publicly 
traded on an American market, with the median year of their Initial Public Offering being 1993. 
Because most (87%) of the brands are owned by private firms, many don't have a public market 
for their shares and are not susceptible to stockholder activists. The most recent revenue publicly 
available for each brand ranged from $77 thousand to $39 billion, with $4-5 million as the 
median. The highest number of published manufacturing countries in operation by a single brand 
was 41, with a median and mode of 1. The most common manufacturing countries were China, 
India, and Bangladesh, which is consistent with the global industry.  
The targeted customer demographic for the brands was 43% both male and female, 45% 
female only, and 13% male only. Brands targeted adults-only in 70% of the sample, with 26% of 
the remainder targeting more than one age group (children and teens-only stores composed 4% in 
total). Additional variables collected include year of closure (if applicable), parent company 
information, types of apparel or footwear offered, number of employees, NAICS codes, and 
whether the brand was selling PPE facemasks in response to COVID-19 in the summer of 2020 
(Appendix 2). 
When found, failed brands that had gone out of businesses were kept in the dataset as an 
important component of my ecological and evolutionary analysis. For instance, if a brand fails to 
adapt to the increasingly “responsible” rhetoric, they may not survive. Originally, I planned to 
incorporate failed brand data to test whether brands adapt to external pressures for ethical 
practices in order to survive. However, only 15 brands (3%) were found to have ceased 
operations. Considering that 65% of private companies fail within their first decade, it appears 
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that my dataset was limited in its capture of failed businesses (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
There is a chance that they did not last long enough to leave a record, but this systematically 
missing data restricts my understanding of what brand characteristics may lead to success and 
failure in the contextual environment. 
Additional limitations include not observing non-American owned brands, thus excluding 
the global narrative in the apparel industry. There are many sustainable fashion initiatives in 
Europe, eCommerce has allowed international sales to flourish, and the majority of garment 
production primarily takes place in developing nations of South Asia. Therefore, a global 
perspective is critical for future and continued study.  
Primary Source Data: Webpage Collection 
Website pages were chosen as the primary source for text analysis because they offer a 
flexible and customized platform where brands form identity and legitimacy-making strategies. 
Alternate considerations included advertisements, impact reports, social media, and press, 
however, advertisements are too image and product-oriented, impact reports are not conducted 
by all brands, social media is inconsistent and short-lived, and press does always not offer 
rhetoric directly from brands. Additionally, I needed to collect a full timeline of data from a 
sources from 2005-2020. The Wayback Machine, crawls across millions of webpages and has a 
full archive. This source was chosen as a suitable source as it was used in similar research 
analyzing indicators of green innovation activities within U.S. enterprises (Arora et al 2016).  
For every year between 2005 and 2020 that a brand had an archived website, we selected 
an available archive date near the middle of the year. Then, we searched through the site for 
rhetoric describing the brand’s story, history, “about us,” values, mission, creation process, 
environmental impact, social impact, manufacturing protocol, philanthropic efforts, and non-
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profit or community partners. Any page containing this information was downloaded as a PDF, 
named by its corresponding brand and year. Because no brand website is the same, we captured 
as much information as possible, specifically looking for any references deemed appropriate by 
these guidelines. If a brand did not have rhetoric relating to the study, the homepage was 
downloaded as a control. The final dataset contained 7,409 webpages. The median links 
downloaded per brand was 10, with a minimum of 0 and maximum of 189 across 15 years. Due 
to archive errors, the lifespan of brands, and the expansion of the internet, the yearly distribution 
of downloads is negatively skewed with 12.5% of all downloads occurring in 2020 alone 
(Appendix 3, Table 3.2).3  
Beyond limitations from brand data collection and the Wayback Machine’s web-crawling 
accuracy, thoroughness of the website data is likely systematically linked to a brand’s available 
capital. Less successful brands likely have less resources to contribute to environmental and 
social responsibility, web development, or communications budgets, thus limiting their 
measurable cause-related rhetoric. For these reasons, I control for factors such as brand revenue, 
number of employees, and years in operation in my analysis. 
  
 
3 No weights were applied to the webpage collection. Therefore, the following word counts and text analyses 
underrepresent the Random Sample of brands (5.5% probability) and overrepresent the non-traditional and high-
revenue brands that were selected with 100% probability. I justify this method due to the prominence of the high-
revenue brands within the apparel market and the general lack of information available for the Random Sample 
brands. For analysis, the key differentiator between brands was their coding as traditional and non-traditional, not 
their sampling method and probability. 
   
 







From the dataset of 7,409 webpages, I measured the frequency of selected words and 
phrases in order to quantify the impact-related rhetoric employed by brands throughout 2005-
2020. First, I selected a group of 517 webpage downloads across years and brand-type. Then, 
using MAXQDA, I coded each page for impact-related terms to build a dictionary for analysis. I 
relied on previous research on corporate social responsibility messaging to inform the terms 
chosen for coding, as well as my personal expertise and familiarity with retail impact reporting 
that grew as a result of data collection and assessing the industry. An example of previous 
literature is Chae and Park’s topic modelling analysis of 178,908 Tweets related to CSR which 
derived 31 topics including “strategy, social business, entrepreneurship, green initiative, climate, 
energy, water waste, community charity, supply chain, human rights, and business ethics” 
(2018). Additionally, Kozlowski, Searcy, and Bardecki’s study on 14 apparel brands’ CSR 
reports found the following 5 topics from 87 reporting indicators: Sustainable Supply Chain 
Management, Design Practices, Business Innovation, Consumer Engagement, and Product 
Sustainability (2015). These previously established topics created a starting point for my search 
and set the standard to support my final ratio of terms to number of topics. 
My final impact dictionary contained 841 terms ranging from “water,” “organic cotton,” 
“corporate social responsibility,” “stewardship,” “audit,” and so on, encapsulating various social, 
environmental, and philanthropic signals from apparel brands. Following inductive thematic 
   
 
 22  
 
analysis methods, I manually grouped the 841 terms by their similarities and synonyms, 
simplifying until there were several main topics (with additional subcategories) (Kuckartz 2014). 
For example, “working conditions” and “child labor” were two terms that reference apparel 
brands’ manufacturing workers, so they were grouped into a subcategory with other similar 
terms until the “Workers” group had a significant word frequency to warrant its own topic. This 
process was repeated for all terms and resulted in the following 8 topics: Environmental Impact, 
Social Impact, Philanthropy, Workers, Causes Served, Business and Industry, Certifications and 
Audits/Reporting, and Named Partners or Impact Organizations.  
Topic Frequency 
Once the dictionary and thematic topics were developed from a sample of the webpages, 
I ran a lexical search in MAXQDA across the entire dataset to report each term’s frequency per 
document. The final count included 120,740 instances of impact-related terms across the dataset, 
and a total word count of 4,675,452. Thus, impact terms constitute a small 2.6% of the total word 
count, which can be explained by two factors. First, the method of webpage data collection 
indicated that if a brand did not have a CSR-related page, the home page was downloaded. These 
pages add to the total word count without contributing to the impact count. In fact, of the 482 
brands with at least one webpage download over 15 years, 10% (n=46) did not have any impact-
related words, 52% (n=250) had less than 100 impact words, and only 5% (n=26) had more than 
1,000 impact words, contributing 50% of the impact word count. This skewed distribution 
accounts for the small absolute values and indicates that the majority of apparel brands have 
limited responsibility rhetoric, while a small but mighty minority dominate the conversation. 
Second, the search method for collecting impact-related term frequencies required terms to be 
context-exclusive. I did not measure words like “good” or “positive” that may have been used to 
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describe a brands’ impact, but could have also appeared in many other contexts (for example, to 
describe the product or their customer’s persona). While my methodological choices limited the 
impact word percentage, they offer validity to the analysis.  
By linking the lexical search term frequencies to corresponding topics and subcategories, 
I then analysed topic trends over time. The frequency and top 5 subcategories for each topic are 
shown in Table 1 to provide a synopsis of what they represent in the context of the apparel 
industry. For example, the topic with the most prevalence in the dataset was Environmental 
Impact (33,266 total instances), with its top 5 subcategories consisting of words related to 
sustainability, recycling, environment, organic [materials], and energy [usage]. Next, I used 
Tableau to study each topic’s percent of the total word count over time. Figure 1 depicts all 8 
impact topics’ word count as a percent of the total word count for each year. The resulting 
trajectories for different topics confirms my choice to study them separately and suggests that 
brands may be responding to topic-specific external pressures which is reflected by their 
changing discourse. In the following sections, I examine the statistical significance of topic 
trends and discuss what factors account for these results. 
Topic Trends and Brand Characteristics Analysis 
To answer the research questions, I investigated linear relationships between traditional 
and non-traditional brands’ topic trends and impact word percentages. For analysis, these 
percentages were calculated separately by dividing each brand-type’s impact word count by its 
corresponding brand-type total word count. The purpose of unique denominators (as opposed to 
finding each brand-type’s impact word percentage of the total population word count) was to 
control for differences between traditional and non-traditional brands such as their growing 
population size and “wordiness” each year, as well as the increase in webpages downloaded over 
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time (2016-2020 constitute 47% of the webpages). As the descriptive statistics show, traditional 
brands represented 75% of the sample (89% weighted), therefore, their impact word percentage 
is naturally much higher when compared directly to non-traditional brands. I controlled for these 
factors by viewing impact word percentages within the brand-type, and then analyzed the 
statistical significance of topic trendlines to comment on the convergence and divergence of each 
brand-type’s different virtue-signalling themes and strategies over time.  
After studying brand-type topic trends, I analyzed how brand characteristics may have 
influenced the traditional and non-traditional groups’ overall impact word percentages. 
Specifically, I look within brand-types to discover how their trends differ based on revenue, 
public or private status, parent company status, founder sex, customer sex, and geographic 
location. These variables were chosen for further analysis for several reasons. First, revenue, 
trading status, and parent company variables indicate a brands’ obligations and resources 
available for cause-related marketing. Second, founder sex indicates the representation of men 
and women founders at traditional and non-traditional brands as well as their relative influence 
on impact. Meanwhile, customer sex may identify differences in the conscious consumer market. 
Third, geographic location differences may indicate policy and competitor influences. Finally, all 
of these characteristics are commonly studied in relational organization research, since 
organizations compete within a population of similar industry, geographic, client, and volume-
based peers (Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippmann 2020). 
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Table 1: Top 5 Subcategory Frequencies by Topic 
Topic Subcategory Word 
Frequency 
Environmental Impact  33266 
 Sustainable/Sustainability 5001 
 Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, Renew, Restore, Repair, Reverse, Upcycle 4722 
 Environment 3098 
 Organic 3041 
 Energy 2805 
Business/Industry  20141 
 Responsibility 7287 
 Transparent, Open and Honest 2690 
 Strategic, Goals, Long-Term 1694 
 Value Chain, Collective/Shared Value 1530 
 Purpose 1150 
Certifications, Audits/Reporting  16240 
 Compliance 4791 
 Code of Conduct 2706 
 Certified, Certificate, Accredited 2209 
 Audit/Verification 1768 
 California Supply Chains Act 1018 
Workers  13893 
 Forced Labor/Slavery/Child Labor 5060 
 Human Trafficking, Sex Trafficking 2236 
 Working Conditions 2152 
 Training 1894 
 Wages 822 
Philanthropy  13702 
 Communities, Outreach 5289 
 Donate/Give 3479 
 Charity 1357 
 Nonprofit/NGO 797 
 Volunteer/Serve 699 
Social Impact  16517 
 Ethical/Ethics 2700 
 Grassroots, Local 2624 
 Diversity, Equity, Inclusion 2391 
 Social Responsibility 1610 
 Global/Worldwide 1497 
Causes Served  3659 
 Education 1298 
 Hospitals/Cancer 867 
 Animals 298 
 Outdoors 226 
 Victims 170 
Named Partners or Impact Orgs  3322 
 Fair Trade 978 
 B Corp 244 
 Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production 224 
 Bluesign 196 
 Fair Labor Association 186 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Brand-Type Findings 
As predicted, the raw frequency of impact words increased significantly (p<0.01) from 
2005 to 2020 for both traditional and non-traditional brand-types (Figure 2). Traditional brands’ 
impact word count increased from 224 to 12,301 and non-traditional brands’ impact word count 
increased from 787 to 7,589 over the 15-year period. Even though traditional brands outnumber 
non-traditional brands, they began with a lower frequency of impact words in 2005, then quickly 
caught up to non-traditional brands by 2008, and surpassed them in 2011. This impressive 
increase (1.9k words per year) relative to non-traditional brands’ (0.9k words per year) supports 
the theory that social, competitive, and technological forces acted on traditional brands’ 
demonstration of responsibility during this time.  
Figure 2 also provides a baseline understanding of the data source volume for each year, 
which is important to consider for validity. For example, consider the synchronous movement of 
both brand-types from 2017 to 2018 (decrease) and from 2019 to 2020 (increase). Rather than a 
response to external pressures, these parallel changes are best explained by the number of 
webpage downloads for those years. The Wayback Machine inexplicably had fewer webpages 
available for 2018 than previous years, and 2020 webpages were downloaded in real-time, so no 
brand was missing due to archival discrepancies (Appendix 3, Table 3.2). Unfortunately, this 
reduces the overall data quality since I did not capture an accurate word count for all brands in 
all years. That is why I focus on the trend lines, which demonstrate two points: (1) technological 
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advancements led to an absolute increase in website verbiage representing brands and (2) cause-
related marketing frequency increased. The latter supports previous literature and reflects the 
broader growth of strategic CSR in response to policy and social pressures. My additional 
analyses help explain the key drivers behind this increase. 
The controlled metric (brand-types’ separated impact word percent of total words), 
reveals conflicting trends between traditional and non-traditional brands (Figure 3). Traditional 
brands started with 0.68% of their words dedicated to impact in 2005 and ended with 3.3% 
impact words in 2020, representing a significant increase in the line of best fit (p<0.01).4 This 
trend supports Figure 2 and my hypothesis that traditional brands used more impact rhetoric to 
become more similar to non-traditional brands. Alternatively, non-traditional brands started with 
3.78% impact words in 2005 and ended with 3.81% in 2020 (Figure 3). While there is a 
(miniscule) net increase, the line of best fit has a negative slope (p<0.05) due to a consistent 
decrease in percent impact-words from 2012-2018, which fell as low as 1.87%. Unpredictably, 
non-traditional brands generally used less of their webpage words to discuss impact while, 
relatively, traditional brands used more. As isomorphism suggests, brands in competition mimic 
one another. The unexpected decrease in non-traditional brands’ percent of impact-words may be 
a result of their desire to compete with traditional brands, who historically focused on product 
quality and style as a selling point, not sustainability or social impact. As a result, non-traditional 
brands may have chosen to dedicate more words on their webpages to bring in revenue, as 
opposed to establishing their consequential legitimacy. While the two brand types were 
 
4 The percentages and deltas are very small in absolute value because of the overall word counts (120,740 impact-
related terms vs. 4.6 million total word count), which reinforces my focus on trend line slope significance. 
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competing with one another, they may have needed to employ different strategies to achieve 
success in a changing socio-political environment. 
As an additional measure, Figure 4 shows traditional and non-traditional brands’ share of 
the impact word count, isolated from all other words. Thus, their shares sum to 100% of the 
impact words coded for each year and move directly inverse to one another.  From this viewpoint 
we see that, despite only representing 25% of the sample, non-traditional brands represented the 
majority of impact words until 2009 and 2010, at which point the trend lines cross and traditional 
brands began dominating the apparel industry’s conversation, at least by volume, with the 
majority share of impact words. This crossover sparks questions such as how and why did 
traditional brands greatly accelerate their share of impact rhetoric in 2011? Why didn’t non-
traditional brands maintain the lead?  
The results shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 begin to support H1 which predicted that 
traditional brand rhetoric was becoming more similar to non-traditional brands over time. 
Specifically, Figure 3 shows convergence of the two brand-types in which traditional brands’ 
impact word percentage increased to more closely match non-traditional brands. In 2015, their 
percentages met, and for the next five years they appeared to follow a similar trajectory. This 
suggests that traditional brands started to mimic non-traditional brands’ representation of impact 
and responsibility, although causality cannot be explained with this data. Additionally, the 
dominance of traditional brands’ impact rhetoric started in 2011; non-traditional brands’ 
significant decrease in impact percentage prompts a more detailed look. What follows is deeper 
topic analysis to assess the full hypothesis with regards to discourse similarities, not simply 
rhetorical volume. 
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Figure 2: Impact Word Frequency by Brand-Type 
 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 1.8725***, Standard Error 0.1974, R-Squared=0.86 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient 0.9152***, Standard Error 0.1095, R-Squared=0.83 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
 
Figure 3: Impact Word Percent of Total Word Count by Brand-Type 
 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 2.424e-06**, Standard Error 7.555e-07, R-Squared=0.42 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -2.173e-06*, Standard Error 8.076e-07, R-Squared=0.34 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
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Figure 4: Percent Share of Impact Words by Brand-Type 
 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 0.023**, Standard Error 0.006, R-Squared=0.54 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -0.023***, Standard Error 0.006, R-Squared=0.54 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
 
Brand-Type Findings by Topic 
The 8 impact topics (Environmental Impact, Social Impact, Philanthropy, Workers, 
Causes Served, Business and Industry, Certifications and Audits/Reporting, and Named Partners 
or Impact Organizations) provided interesting insights to explain what drove brand-type impact 
rhetoric change over time. Six categories significantly changed for at least one brand-type and 
can be split into two main groups, the first in which three topics increase for traditional brands, 
and the second in which three topics decrease for non-traditional brands. The remaining two 
topics are discussed last, as they did not increase or decrease significantly for either brand-type.  
The first group was traditional brand increases, which reflects neo-institutional theories 
by responding to identifiable social contexts and formal regulations. These growing topics 
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include Named Partners or Impact Organizations, Workers, and Certifications and 
Audits/Reporting (Figure 5). All three of these topics tend to rely on the participation of third-
parties such as factory auditors, certifying bodies, and non-profit partners. For example, to report 
sustainability metrics and comply with FTC Guidelines, a certification is often needed to be 
passed and paid for. To abide by workers’ rights laws, factory safety and wage audits are 
conducted on an annual basis. Of the 8 topics, these three are most strongly tied to the 
certification strategy of legitimacy and to the coercive form of isomorphic pressure. Therefore, I 
assert that traditional brands increased their impact-related discourse primarily to avoid negative 
press from breaking regulatory guidelines and to attract conscious consumers using 
responsibility-related accolades that help them stand out from fellow brands. 
To further understand traditional brands’ increasing topics, I first explore the Named 
Partners or Impact Organizations topic. It is the only topic of these three that has a higher percent 
of words for non-traditional brands through the entire timeline, and while the non-traditional 
trend appears to increase (almost entirely due to the term “Fair Trade”), the relationship is 
insignificant. However, for traditional brands, Impact Organization references increased 
significantly (p<0.01), with the most prominent subcategories being the Sustainable Apparel 
Coalition (SAC), Higg Index, Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), and Fair 
Labor Association (FLA). FLA was founded in 1999 and is a Washington, D.C. non-profit run 
by academic institutions, civil society organizations, and businesses whose mission is to enforce 
labor laws (Appendix 1). WRAP began in 2000 as a certifying body for apparel factory standards 
and was established to promote safe, lawful, and human manufacturing worldwide (Appendix 1). 
However, as a partner for the American Apparel and Footwear Association, it has been critiqued 
for being industry-driven and self-serving. Similarly, the prominent SAC was formed in 
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California in 2009 by Walmart and Patagonia with other high-revenue members including Gap 
Inc., Abercrombie and Fitch, Levi’s, and J. Crew, as well as some successful non-traditional 
members like Allbirds and Reformation (Appendix 1). As an industry-led coalition (not a federal 
imposition), it serves to support apparel brands in their responsibility efforts, without demanding 
transparent reporting. The SAC also developed the Higg Index in 2012 to measure apparel 
sustainability metrics. Traditional brands’ relatively quick adaptation of the SAC and Higg Index 
in webpage rhetoric (from 2009 to 2020), reflects an industry-specific strategy used to signal 
their legitimate belonging. In fact, the Changing Markets Foundation claims, “brands and 
retailers widely use their mere participation in the Higg Index as evidence that they are 
committed to reducing environmental impacts in their supply chains…despite the scheme’s 
current shortcomings and the lack of clarity for consumers about what improvements companies 
are making” (Brad et al. 2018). Within the apparel industry, membership to the SAC is a way to 
signal support of an environmental mission and present amicability with competitors. Reflecting 
mimetic pressures of isomorphism, these brands were “joining forces in a Coalition” as the 
industry began facing increased scrutiny by creating and promoting a named impact organization 
in order build consequential legitimacy with the public (Sustainable Apparel Coalition). 
The second topic that significant increased for traditional brands is Workers (p<0.001). 
The topic displays a noticeable inflection point between 2011 and 2012 (Figure 5). After which, 
the traditional brands rapidly increased usage of Workers topic terms such as “Forced Labor,” 
“Child Labor,” “Slavery,” “Working Conditions”, and “Training.” Meanwhile, non-traditional 
brands percent of words involving Workers did not have the same acceleration. I attribute this 
variation to the enactment of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which was 
passed in 2010 and became active on January 1st, 2012. The law serves as a federal regulation to 
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“ensure that the goods they sell are not produced by workers who are enslaved, coerced, or 
otherwise forced into service or who have been the victims of human trafficking” (Harris, 2015). 
Guidelines also require businesses to display their statement of compliance with the CA Supply 
Chains Act on their website, resulting in similar language across the industry. The distinguishing 
factor, however, is that the Act applied only to brands that “do business in California, have 
annual worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 million, and are identified as manufacturers or 
retail sellers on their California state tax returns” (Harris, 2015).  These stipulations 
disproportionately affected larger and more profitable brands, which were mostly traditional-
coded in my dataset. Therefore, there was a strong increase of Worker-related terms from 2012 
onward for traditional brands (most of which did business in California in some way). As a 
coercive pressure of isomorphism, traditional brands clearly responded to this force.  
Third, the Certifications and Audits/Reporting topic shared a similar trajectory as the 
Workers topic. The parallel movement of these two topics suggest that brands were responding 
to similar external pressures that impacted their representation of their Workers and 
Certifications and Audits/Reporting. Even in Figure 1, which combines both brand-types, we see 
that both topics sharply increased in 2011-2012, rose and fell concurrently, and continued 
converging until 2020, when they each held 0.5% of the total word count. When we separate the 
brand-types (Figure 5), we can see that it was traditional brands driving those topics’ similar 
trajectories, with a significant increase in Certifications and Audits/Reporting (p<0.001). This 
topic’s driving subcategories were “Compliance,” “Code of Conduct,” and “Audit” for 
traditional brands. Accordingly, these were also main components required by the CA 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act. In combination with the Higg Index rating released in 2012, 
traditional brands portrayed certification legitimacy strategies in response to external regulators.  
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Importantly, there was a confounding socio-political context in the years following the 
2012 CA Act: two disasters, a garment factory fire in Dhaka, Bangladesh in November, 2012 
which killed 117 people, and in April, 2013, the Rana Plaza factory collapsed in Dhaka, taking 
1,134 lives (Appendix 1). These events led to two activist non-profits, Fashion Revolution and 
Remake, founded in 2013 and 2016 respectively. While these social forces did not directly 
enforce traditional brands’ factory audits, certifications, and workers’ conditions, they have 
applied consumer and media pressure that encourages brands to continue complying with laws, 
joining Coalitions, and displaying voluntary certifications they may have gained. Although non-
traditional brands did not have a significant increase directly related to the CA Act, there is some 
movement, which suggests that as more non-traditional brands grow in revenue, more will fall 
under the legislation and act in compliance. Overall, the 2012 spike in traditional brands’ Named 
Impact Organizations, Workers, and Certification topics was catalysed by the CA Act, but the 
continued increase over time is better explained by a combination of mimetic and normative 
isomorphic pressures created by the garment factory disasters and resulting social activism. 
In the second group for discussion, three topics significantly decreased for non-traditional 
brands, and had no significant change for traditional brands. These topics are Philanthropy 
(p<0.001), Social Impact (p<0.01), and Business and Industry (p<0.05) (Figure 6). The meaning 
of their decline was more difficult to decipher because the raw frequency of each topic increased 
(or remained stagnant) over time, even though the percentage of word count decreased. 
Therefore, philanthropy, social impact, and general business impact rhetoric were not necessarily 
exiting the non-traditional apparel space; instead, they may have lost importance in favour of 
other dialogues. Because no other coded topics increased significantly for non-traditional brands, 
there is not an impact-related alternative taking the place of these three topics. Therefore, I 
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attribute the decline to an overall increase in words on non-traditional brand websites and, 
presumptively, an increased focus on efforts to sell the brand personality and product. Impact-
related terms simply did not grow in proportion to non-traditional brands’ overall web content. 
This finding contradicts my hypothesis that non-traditional brands acted as a mimetic force on 
traditional brands. If anything, the Philanthropy topic in Figure 6 depicts a convergence of non-
traditional and traditional brands, as the non-traditional percentage decreased to match traditional 
brands’ flatter trend, moving in parallel from 2010 onward. For all topics combined, non-
traditional brands decreased their overall impact-word percentages while traditional brands 
increased (Figure 2). Therefore, I conclude that the two brand-types were responding to different 
external pressures, instead of non-traditional brands acting as a mimetic influence. 
Finally, I address the insignificant topic results. Only two of the eight topics had no 
significant increase or decrease for either traditional or non-traditional brands, Environmental 
Impact and Causes Served (Figure 7). Despite the Environmental Impact topic having the highest 
frequency and share of the total word count for all 15 years of analysis (Figure 1), there was no 
significant increase or decrease in the topic’s percent of word share by either brand-type. 
However, the gap between non-traditional and traditional brands’ percent of words dedicated to 
Environmental Impact narrowed. I safely infer that it appears within a few years following 2020, 
the trend lines for Environmental Impact will converge and cross. This suggests that traditional 
brands adapted to an increasingly environmentally-conscious context while non-traditional 
brands made fewer changes, despite starting with a higher focus on sustainability. Second, the 
Causes Served topic did not have a significant change but did display similarities between brand-
types throughout the timeline. The primary causes served were Education, Health and Hospitals, 
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and the Outdoors/Animals, which reflect a shared sociocultural context in which normative 
values are consistent for traditional and non-traditional brands’ when choosing causes to support.  
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0=Traditional - Coefficient 4.282e-08**, Standard Error 1.173e-08, R-Squared=0.48 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient 9.578e-08, Standard Error 5.302e-08, R-Squared=0.18 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 8.739e-07***, Standard Error 8.959e-08, R-Squared=0.87 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient 1.811e-07, Standard Error 8.513e-08, R-Squared=0.24 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 7.359e-07***, Standard Error 9.228e-08, R-Squared=0.81 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -1.908e-08, Standard Error 1.294e-07, R-Squared=0.00 
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0=Traditional - Coefficient -1.481e-07, Standard Error 1.194e-07, R-Squared=0.09 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -7.825e-07***, Standard Error 1.51e-07, R-Squared=0.76 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 8.478e-08, Standard Error 1.374e-07, R-Squared=0.02 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -3.459e-07**, Standard Error 1.178e-07, R-Squared=0.38 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 3.465e-07, Standard Error 2.068e-07, R-Squared=0.16 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -4.067e-07*, Standard Error 1.536e-07, R-Squared=0.33 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
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0=Traditional - Coefficient 0.0487, Standard Error 0.021e-07, R-Squared=0.19 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -8.878e-07, Standard Error 5.103e-07, R-Squared=0.17 
0=Traditional - Coefficient 0.003e-08, Standard Error 0.001e-08, R-Squared=0.17 
1=Nontraditional - Coefficient -0.010e-08 Standard Error, 0.008e-08, R-Squared=0.10 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
 
 
Brand-Type Findings by Characteristic 
 Using the demographic data collected on individual brand characteristics, I further 
explain what factors were driving change within each brand-type. I address three main factors: 
resources, sex, and U.S. state. Together, resources and U.S. state data provide further support 
that the CA Transparency in Supply Chains Act was a significant factor in traditional brands’ 
impact-word growth over time. Since the Act applied to high-revenue brands that conduct 
business in California, the significantly positive relationship (p<0.001) between those 
characteristics and impact-word percentages support my conclusion (Figures 8 and 11). For sex, 
Figure 12 shows that the impact-related conversation for both traditional and non-traditional 
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brand-types was dominated by the 249 brands founded by men (50% of the unweighted brand 
population). However, more brands were catering to either mixed-gender or female clothing 
customers, with both brand-types showing an increase of 0.04% impact-words per year 
(p<0.001) for female-only clothing offerings, as coded by the researchers (Figure 13). These 
characteristic trends offer insight to the industry and social contexts surrounding apparel brands’ 
responsibility and impact. 
Elaborating further, resources were considered as a combination of revenue, private vs. 
public status, and parent company ownership status. These resources imply a brands’ greater 
cause-marketing power and ability to pay for impact-related memberships and certifications. As 
a baseline, traditional brands had more resources, since 29% were publicly owned (opposed to 
6% of non-traditional brands), and had an average revenue of $604 million (opposed to $78 
million for non-traditional brands)5. In confirmation, for both traditional and non-traditional 
brands, higher revenue indicated a higher average annual impact-word percentage (p<0.001) 
(Figure 8). Figure 8 addresses H(a), which predicted that the highest grossing traditional apparel 
brands increase their impact-words first, followed by smaller and less profitable brands. Without 
each year’s annual revenue, I cannot assess the chronological relationship of revenue and impact, 
but the data does reveal a significant relationship between the two.  
The positive influence of resources on impact-rhetoric is further confirmed by the two 
ownership variables: public vs. private status and parent company ownership status, which both 
correlate with higher revenue and resources. Because publicly traded brands are expected to 
deliver dividends to stockholders, I explored if their choices reflected maximizing revenue and 
 
5 Percentages and average revenue are based on unweighted calculations, as the text analysis did not account for 
population sampling. 
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minimizing costs for materials and wages (less positive impact) or if they reflected a choice to 
attract stockholders with a stronger brand image (more normative compliance and virtue-
signalling). Figure 9 reveals that the latter is likely true, since public traditional brands’ impact 
words significantly increased by 0.06% each year (p<0.05), while private traditional brands’ 
impact words increased by 0.03% each year (p<0.01). In addition, publicly traded non-traditional 
brands had a positive slope (although insignificant), while private non-traditional brands’ share 
of impact words significantly decreased (p<0.05).  
Finally, Figure 10 depicts brands’ trends based on whether they were owned by a parent 
company as of 2020. Interestingly, traditional and non-traditional brands diverged here, as 
impact words for traditional brands with a parent company significantly increased 0.6% each 
year (p<0.05) while impact words for non-traditional brands with a parent company significantly 
decreased 0.07% each year (p<0.001). The traditional brands continue to support the assumption 
that impact-words increase with greater resources. Non-traditional brands owned by a parent 
company matched the overall non-traditional brand trends, which were decreasing in percent of 
impact-related words over time. However, if having a parent company makes non-traditional 
brands more obligated to bring in revenue for the company portfolio, then this supports my 
presumption that non-traditional brands are focusing more on words dedicated to selling their 
products, rather than reinforcing their impact-related dialogue. 
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Coefficient 5.648e-07***, Standard Error 7.876e-08, R-Squared=0.15, DF=291 
Coefficient 1.559e-06***, Standard Error 2.982e-07, R-Squared=0.22, DF=96 
Linear Trend Model (ln(Revenue)+intercept), Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Nike was removed as an outlier from traditional brands, with $40 billion in revenue 
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0=Private - Coefficient 0.0003**, Standard Error 8.153e-05, R-Squared=0.41 
1=Public - Coefficient 0.0006*, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.35 
0=Private - Coefficient -0.0009*, Standard Error 0.0003, R-Squared=0.33 
1=Public - Coefficient 0.0001, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.04 
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0=No Parent - Coefficient 0.0002, Standard Error 0.0001, R-Squared=0.16 
1=Parent - Coefficient 0.006*, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.43 
0=No Parent - Coefficient -1.631e-05, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.00 
1=Parent - Coefficient -0.0007***, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.64 
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5=CA - Coefficient 0.0003***, Standard Error 4.378e-05, R-Squared=0.77 
30=NH - Coefficient -0.0003, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.17 
33=NY - Coefficient 0.0002***, Standard Error 4.144e-05, R-Squared=0.72 
36=OH - Coefficient 6.257e-05, Standard Error 0.0001, R-Squared=0.02 
48=WA - Coefficient -5.675e-05, Standard Error 3.353e-05, R-Squared=0.17 
5=CA - Coefficient -0.0003, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.13 
6=CO - Coefficient -3.634e-06, Standard Error 3.904e-05, R-Squared=0.00 
33=NY - Coefficient -0.0004*** Standard Error 7.452e-05, R-Squared=0.67 
36=OH - Coefficient -2.269e-05, Standard Error 1.757e-05, R-Squared=0.11 
48=WA - Coefficient -0.0002, Standard Error 0.0001, R-Squared=0.11 
Trend Line T-Test, Note - *<p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, DF=14 
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0=Female - Coefficient 0.0003***, Standard Error 4.713e-05, R-Squared=0.73 
1=Male - Coefficient 0.0003, Standard Error 0.0003, R-Squared=0.12 
2=Both - Coefficient 0.0002***, Standard Error 5.331e-05, R-Squared=0.59 
0=Female - Coefficient -5.879e-05, Standard Error 0.0001, R-Squared=0.01 
1=Male - Coefficient -0.0007***, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.61 
2=Both - Coefficient 3.013e-05, Standard Error 0.0001, R-Squared=0.01 
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0=Female - Coefficient 0.0004***, Standard Error 5.236e-05, R-Squared=0.83 
1=Male - Coefficient 6.584e-05***, Standard Error 1.173e-05, R-Squared=0.69 
2=Both - Coefficient 0.0004, Standard Error 0.0003, R-Squared=0.13 
0=Female - Coefficient 0.0004***, Standard Error 9.372e-05, R-Squared=0.62 
1=Male - Coefficient 3.68e-05, Standard Error 2.424e-05, R-Squared=0.18 
2=Both - Coefficient -0.001***, Standard Error 0.0002, R-Squared=0.00 






   
 







Using text analysis from an original dataset, this study revealed a dynamic and growing 
discourse for apparel brands’ corporate impact over the past 15 years. The hypothesis that 
traditional brands followed in non-traditional brands footsteps was only partially supported. The 
results showed that non-traditional brands dominated the impact conversation in earlier years 
(2005-2009), but traditional brands quickly increased their impact-related rhetoric while non-
traditional brands fell behind. Perhaps non-traditional brands served as a mimetic example in the 
beginning, but the topic-level results suggest that traditional brands became more purpose-driven 
by responding to their own contextual factors, not by imitating specific non-traditional brand 
rhetoric. Therefore, my main conclusion is that non-traditional and traditional apparel brands 
were exposed to different external pressures and thus responded with different discursive 
legitimization strategies. This conclusion aligns with neo-institutional theory while providing 
nuance to the growing field of corporate impact. Although the data cannot explain every increase 
or decrease in brands’ dialogue, several important findings support my conclusion. 
Traditional brands showed clear sensitivity to their environment by reflecting the 
legitimacy imperative of formal regulations in their discursive legitimization strategies (Scott 
2008). Their strategies were multifaceted and included (1) impact-related certifications or ratings 
and (2) isomorphism resulting from coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). First, the increase of traditional brands’ certification and audits topic displayed 
their use of certification as a public strategy for legitimacy. Interestingly, previous research 
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suggested that non-traditional or newer brands would be more likely to use certification as a 
strategy to establish themselves, but here we see the opposite (Carroll 1993; Grimes, Gehman, 
Cao 2018). Instead, it appears traditional brands used the certification strategy to legitimate their 
cause-related marketing and avoid negative press for what could otherwise be considered 
greenwashing.  
In response to isomorphic forces, additional strategies were displayed by traditional 
brands. First, following coercive pressures like the CA Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 
brands collectively increased the Workers topic with discourse including Vendor Codes of 
Conduct, compliance, and opposition to forced labor. These findings support Islam and 
McPhail’s neo-institutional research on 18 global clothing companies that significantly increased 
their human rights language in response to the 1998 endorsement of the International Labor 
Organization’s standards (2011).  My study shows that similar patterns found by Islam and 
McPhail continued to occur in the early 21st century at a national level. Second, following 
mimetic pressures, traditional brands increased their involvement with similar Impact 
Organizations. In other words, they imitated each other to navigate uncertain conditions and 
changing expectations for sustainability and social impact (Lounsbury and Zhao 2013). This was 
exemplified by many brands joining SAC and submitting data to the Higg Index, supporting 
Sharkey and Bromley’s findings that firms were more likely to obtain environmental ratings if a 
collective presence of peers had done so (2015). Third, normative pressures in the sociocultural 
context, such as a resurgence of apparel-related social activism and increased consumer 
concerns, resulted in a steady increase of traditional brands’ discursive impact signalling 
throughout the late 2010s. While I can point to specific laws, coalitions, and non-profits that 
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influenced these brands, the combination of additive elements in their shared environment likely 
created an overarching driving force. 
An unprecedented finding was how non-traditional brands’ prominence in the industry’s 
impact-related discursive space waned over time. Unlike traditional brands, non-traditional 
brands’ word and topic percentages significantly decreased. Their direction may be fully 
explained by the denominator (total word count), which reflected an increase in non-impact 
related words on their websites that was disproportional to that of impact words. I suggest that, 
as non-traditional brands became more established, their focus shifted from branding themselves 
as ethical towards selling more products and growing their business. This potential branding shift 
is also partially supported by the findings related to parent company oversight, which found a 
significant decrease in impact-word percentages for non-traditional brands with a parent 
company, while those without a parent company had no change. 
Overall, the outcome of this exploratory text analysis verified the growth of the United 
States apparel industry’s corporate responsibility and virtue-signalling rhetoric, reflecting a 
shared social and regulatory context that has become more environmental and socially conscious. 
Furthermore, the topics discovered in these webpages show how brand discourses have shifted 
focus toward garment workers, impactful partnerships, certification, and data-oriented claims to 
signal legitimate impact. Primarily, traditional brands displayed discursive and isomorphic 
strategies in response to coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures from their sociocultural 
context and industry peers. Ultimately, my contribution supports neo-institutional theories of the 
influence of external factors on organizational discursive legitimacy strategies, and specifically 
elaborates on the domain of corporate social responsibility. 
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Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
While my findings contribute new information, more research is needed to fully 
understand the regulatory environment influencing non-traditional brands, as well as their 
influence on the industry as an emerging sub-population. As a methodical limitation, my text 
analysis did not quantify non-impact related topics, so I was not able to assess changes in the 
discourse that may explain why non-traditional brands’ impact-words declined. Additionally, the 
brand characteristic analysis calls for further research to fully answer the secondary hypothesis. I 
predicted that brands with more financial resources increase their impact-related discourse before 
less profitable brands, which was informed by Bartley and Child’s study of apparel brand 
responses to 1990s anti-sweatshop activism (2014). As mentioned in the results, revenue and 
impact word percentages were significantly and positively related for both traditional and non-
traditional brands. However, results were inconsistent for each brand-type’s public trading status 
and parent company status, suggesting the need for future research considering these resource-
related variables on different brand-types. Finally, revenue was only recorded for one year which 
limited the analysis to a cross-section instead of a longitudinal view of whether certain brands 
adopted higher levels of impact signalling first. A complication to consider for future research on 
revenue is that financial success and corporate responsibility are interdependent and confounded 
by the strength of corporate governance, which I did not account for (Ntim and Soobaryen 2013).  
Answering these questions would allow organizational sociologists to better understand 
how purpose-driven organizations, social enterprises, and traditional companies are influencing 
and influenced by institutional environments in their respective industries. Based on the growing 
prominence of values-related discourse from organizations, I am optimistic that this field of 
research will continue to develop in the coming years. 
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APPENDIX 1. TIMELINE 
Table 1.1 Timeline of Apparel Industry Influences and Regulations 
Date Location Event or 
Organization 








The Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire killed 146 garment workers, 
mostly young immigrant women. It was a critical event in the 
history of the U.S. labor movement, cited as influential to 
developing the New Deal, occupational safety and health 
standards, and the New York City Fire Department (OSHA 
2011). 




The NRF was established to connect retailers in the United 
States. Historically, they have lobbied against higher wages for 







The FTC was established as an independent agency of the United 
States government whose principal mission is the enforcement of 
civil U.S. antitrust law and consumer protection. In relation to 
the apparel industry, they passed the Wool Products Labeling 
Act (1939), Fur Products Labeling Act (1952), Flammable 
Fabrics Act (1954), and Textile Fiber Identification Act (1960) 






The New Deal Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation strengthened labor 
unions and social reform movements, many of which improved 
working conditions in the American garment manufacturing 
industry, including the Wagner Labor Relations Act (which 
protected labor organizing), and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(National Museum of American History). 




Production faded beneath strong labor organizations, government 
regulations, changing immigration patterns, and the shift from 












ISO was established as an independent, non-governmental 
international organization with 165 country standards bodies. 
The 9000-range standards apply to apparel certification. 
1958 Lancaster, PA Fair Trade 
Federation 
The Fair Trade Federation was established to legitimate equitable 
labor and material sourcing for many products. For apparel, 
cotton is particularly certified in accordance with Fair Trade's 
rigorous environmental, economic, and social standards 
(Fairtrade America 2020). 






In the 1950s, the garment workforce began to shift from Italian 
and Jewish immigrants to Puerto Rican and African American 
(National Museum of American History). 
September, 
1962 
United States Silent Spring by 
Rebecca Carsen 
Published 
This was an influential text in environmental protection efforts 




Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 
Changed racial composition of garment workers in America by 
lowering barriers to employment for African Americans 






The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) is a US trade 
association representing retail leaders and their sales goals. 
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President Richard Nixon’s normalization of U.S. relations with 
China in 1972, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, and continued 
instability in Southeast Asia all led to a rise in Asian 
immigration. Foreign-born Asian workers increased in the New 
York garment trade by 265 percent between 1970 and 1980 
(National Museum of American History) 






In the 1970s, manufacturers began moving away from factory 
production to focus on design, brand-name advertising, and 
distribution. This shifted production to contractors in the United 
States and overseas, and sweatshops re-emerged (National 









The EPA would later pass the Clean Water Act (1972) and Clean 
Air Act (1970) which put limits on manufacturing practices in 
the US. This increased outsourced manufacturing to avoid costly 
restrictions. 






OSHA was established as an agency of the United States 
Department of Labor. Its goal is to protect workers, and each 





The Clean Clothes Campaign was established as an alliance of 
labor unions in the garment industry. Alongside non-









Levi Strauss & Co., the world’s largest clothing manufacturer at 
the time, instituted the first corporate code of responsible 
contracting. They were considered an industry leader for this 
(National Museum of American History). 
1992-2000 United States Public protests 
and news 
reports are seen 
against apparel 
sweatshops 
The full account is detailed by Bartley and Child’s Appendix A 
(2011). The protests negatively impacted the reputation and sales 
of the targeted companies, but not drastically. The protest 
pressures may have influenced organizational reforms and 
additional workers compensation/sustainability efforts. The 
Nexis Uni database also suggests that sweatshop protests rose in 
late 1990s and the year 2000, based on the number of articles 







down on unfair 
wages 
Using the threat of seizure, the U.S. Department of Labor 
recovered $12.5 million in back wages owed to more than 40,000 
workers between 1993 and 1997. Los Angeles is replacing New 
York as the hub for garment production in America (National 






The Federal Trade Commission's Green Guides monitor the 
marketing claims of businesses and their environmental impacts. 
This becomes particularly relevant to apparel brands that practice 
"greenwashing" in their communication claims. The Green 








TIPP was established as a joint enforcement and education effort 
of the California Department of Industrial Relations, the 
California Employment Development Department, and the U.S. 
Department of Labor focuses on stopping unfair competition and 
worker exploitation. This heavily affected the garment factories 
in Los Angeles and surrounding cities (TIPP 1996). 
   
 









BSR was established as a global nonprofit business network and 
consultancy dedicated to sustainability. Several large apparel 
brands mention their partnerships with BSR for social and 
sustainability project efforts. 
August, 
1995 
El Monte, CA El Monte 
Sweatshop Raid 
“Police officers raided a fenced compound of seven apartments 
in El Monte, California. They arrested eight operators of a 
clandestine garment sweatshop and freed 72 illegal Thai 
immigrants who had been forced to sew in virtual captivity” 







President Clinton formed the White House Apparel Industry 
Partnership to pursue non-regulatory solutions to sweatshop 
abuses in the United States and abroad. The group was made of 






Fair Wear Foundation is an independent multi-stakeholder 
organization that works with garment brands, garment workers 






The Fair Labor Association is a non-profit collaborative effort of 
universities, civil society organizations, and businesses. Its 
mission enforces international and national labor laws, including 









AAFA is an industry trade group representing hundreds of 
clothing, footwear, and sewn products companies and their 
suppliers. They provide expertise in trade, brand protection, and 
supply chain & manufacturing to help members navigate 









WRAP was established to promote safe, lawful, humane, and 
ethical manufacturing around the world. It is a certifying body 
for factories according to the "Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production Principles". In February 2018, WRAP became the 
official Corporate Social Responsibility partner of the American 
Apparel and Footwear Association. However, its work has been 
described as undermining local labor rights organizations in the 






The Better Cotton Initiative is a non-profit, multi-stakeholder 
governance group that promotes better standards in cotton 
farming and practices across 21 countries. They were founded by 
a collective of major organizations including adidas, Gap Inc., 
H&M, ICCO, IFAP, IFC, IKEA, Organic Exchange, Oxfam, 
PAN UK and WWF. 
2006 Berwyn, PA B Corporation 
Certification 
Established 
"Certified B Corporations are businesses that meet the highest 
standards of verified social and environmental performance, 
public transparency, and legal accountability to balance profit 
and purpose. B Corps are accelerating a global culture shift to 
redefine success in business and build a more inclusive and 
sustainable economy." While B Corporations are not exclusive to 






GOTS is a textile standard with requirements throughout the 
supply chain for both ecology and labor conditions using 
organically produced raw materials. Organic production requires 
a system of farming that maintains and replenishes soil fertility 
without the use of toxic, persistent pesticides and fertilizers. 
   
 





Eco-Age Eco-Age collaborates with NGOs and governments across 
industries to lead apparel brands' corporate responsibility. They 
host the Green Carpet Challenge and Green Carpet Fashion 
Awards as a recognizable figure in the sustainable apparel space. 
2009 Oakland, CA Sustainable 
Apparel 
Coalition 
SAC is working to develop a universal approach to measuring 
sustainability performance. It was formed by Walmart, 
America’s biggest retailer and Patagonia, one of the world’s 








The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board is a non-profit 
organization that develops sustainability accounting standards. 









The Transparency in Supply Chains Act ensures that large 
retailers and manufacturers provide consumers with information 
regarding their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking 
from their supply chains, and, thereby, improve the lives of 
victims of slavery and human trafficking. Companies subject to 
the Transparency in Supply Chains Act must disclose the extent 
of their efforts in five areas: verification, audits, certification, 
internal accountability, and training. The Act applies to retailers 
or sellers doing business in California with annual worldwide 







The Dhaka garment factory fire broke out in the Tazreen Fashion 
factory. At least 117 people were confirmed dead in the fire, and 
over 200 were injured, making it the deadliest factory fire in the 
nation's history. This event and others like it have led to 
numerous proposed reforms in workers' rights and safety laws in 






The Higg Index was developed by SAC as a suite of tools that 
enables brands, retailers, and facilities to measure and score a 
company or product’s sustainability performance. The Index is 
meant to protect the well-being of factory workers, local 
communities, and the environment. 




The 2013 Dhaka garment factory collapse was a structural failure 
where an eight-story commercial building called Rana Plaza 
collapsed. The death toll was 1,134 and it inspired the creation of 
several ethical fashion advocacy groups. As one of the deadliest 
(and preventable) events, this collapse is used as an example for 






Fashion Revolution was established as a global campaign in 
response to the Rana Plaza collapse, with participation from over 
100 countries around the world. Their hashtag campaign, 








The RCC initiative of RILA has helped retailers navigate 
regulatory spaces with the goal of enhancing compliance for 









The SDGs build upon decades of work from the United Nations. 
Starting in the 1980’s, the UN's Commission on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) was tasked with creating a global 
agenda for change in order to address major worldwide social 
and environmental challenges, which culminated in a paper 
called Our Common Future, or the Brundtland report, which led 
to the SDGs being agreed upon at the 2015 UN convention. 
   
 





Remake Remake is a non-profit focusing on educating consumers to 
avoid fast fashion and use their civil powers to challenge apparel 
companies to protect workers and the environment. They most 
recently petitioned apparel brands during the Covid-19 pandemic 
to #PayUp for orders that had been produced by laborers but not 









The UN's Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action has a goal 
to achieve net-zero emissions in the industry by 2050 (United 
Nations 2018). 





Garment workers in California who are not paid their full wages 
may files claims under the Garment Worker Protection Act, a 
law known as AB 633. Under California law, manufacturers and 
retailers are called “guarantors” and must guarantee that garment 
workers receive their wages (California Department of Industrial 
Relations 2019). 
2020 United States “Fast Fashion” 
term reaches 
peak relevancy 
See Figure below for the search history from Google Trends on 
the term “Fast Fashion.” It has steadily grown since 2004 to its 
peak in 2020. 
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Figure 1.2: Google Trends Search Report for “Sustainable Fashion” 2004-2020 
 
Figure 1.3: Nexis Uni Search Results for “Apparel Sweatshop Protest” 1981-2019 
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APPENDIX 2. BRAND DATA 
Table 2.1: Codebook for Apparel Brand Data 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
N DEFINITION + CODEBOOK  RETRIEVAL PROCESS 
SOURCE 
 
 Definition: The source of the brand as it was 
found for the initial population list.  
Indicates where the brand was 
obtained from like Walmart.com or 
Macy’s online, or if the brand was 
found in a business database or 









Definition: This indicates if the brand will 
be included in the final sample or not. 
 
CODE: 
0 = EXCLUDED 
1 = INCLUDED 
 
Indicates whether the listed brand 
meets the following requirements; 1. 
can be verified, 2. sells apparel or 
footwear, 3. is a brand-level and not 
parent company or general portfolio, 
and 4. is incorporated and 








Definition: This indicates the researcher that 
completed the detailed coding of the 
corresponding brand.  
 
CODE: 
1 = PI 
2 = ASSISTANT  
The Coder input their ID when 











Definition: The method of sampling that 




0 = RANDOM 
1 = SELECTED, REVENUE 
2 = SELECTED, NON-TRADITIONAL 
3 stratified samples with differing 
probabilities were obtained from the 
total initial brand list of 5,167.  
 
The first group was a simple random 
sample of 636 brands (12% 
probability), generated by a random 
number calculator. Only 288 of 
those brands (5.5% of the 5,167 
population) qualified for my 
research scope and are coded as 
“Random.” This group was 
weighted at 18.2 for descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Two non-random samples of brands 
followed. Known ethical brands 
were indicated by “Selected, Non-
Traditional” and the highest-revenue 
brands, indicated by “Selected, 
Revenue.” These brands were 
selected with 100% probability due 
to their importance in the study and 
their limited representation in the 
initial random sample. 
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Out of 5,167, 498 is a 99% 
confidence level with confidence 
interval of 5.5. 
BRAND_ID 
 
498 Definition: An arbitrary numerical identifier 




After all brand data was collected, 
they were alphabetized and given a 
corresponding brand ID based on 
their position in the list. 4 were later 
thrown out, leaving 498. 
BRAND_ 
NAME 
498 Definition: The name of the brand, our unit 
of analysis. This excludes names of parent 
companies or retailers; it must be the brand-
level name. 
 
The brand names were collected by 
the PI through various sourcing 
methods, including: Wikipedia lists 
of United States apparel brands and 
retailers; Nexis Uni publications of 
the top publicly traded apparel 
companies, which were separated 
into the subsidiary brands; 
extracting the list of apparel brands 
sold at major retailers and apparel 
stores such as Walmart, Target, 
TJMaxx, JCPenney, SteinMart, 
Macy’s, Nordstrom, Foot Locker, 
Buckle, DSW, Hot Topic, Ladida, 
Marshall’s, PacSun, Ross, Shoe 
Carnival, The Finish Line, Urban 
Outfitters, and others that came up 




 Definition: The country where the brand 
was founded, is currently incorporated, and 
is headquartered. Most often, these are all 
the same country. If there are discrepancies, 
the company’s main headquarters are used 
as the determining location. The input field 
has a validated drop-down list as sourced 
from a list of all countries. 
 
Note: All brands chosen for analysis had 
HQ_COUNTRY as United States, all others 
did not qualify for this analysis. 
This information can be found in 
multiple places, including: the 
brand’s LinkedIn profile (if location 
is mentioned), the brand or parent 
company’s website (look for 
“Contact Us” pages or information 
in the Footer, or finally, a Google 
search of “Brand X Headquarters” 
and resulting sites. 
 
Example: If a brand is international 
and has multiple headquarters, such 
as H&M, which has a United States 
division headquarters – however, it 
was founded and primarily run from 
Sweden, therefore the Incorporated 












Definition: The state where the brand is 
headquartered, as selected from a validated 




. = MISSING 
1=Alabama 
Process: This information can be 
found in multiple places, including: 
ReferenceUSA/Orbis database, the 
brand’s LinkedIn profile (if location 
is mentioned), the brand or parent 
company’s website (look for 
“Contact Us” pages or information 
in the Footer, or finally, a Google 
   
 








































































search of “Brand X Headquarters” 
and resulting sites. 
 
Example: Patagonia is 
headquartered in California. 
 















Definition: The city where the brand is 
headquartered, as selected from a validated 






0-177 =Cities coded alphabetically 
Process: This information can be 
found in multiple places, including: 
ReferenceUSA/Orbis database, the 
brand’s LinkedIn profile (if location 
is mentioned), the brand or parent 
company’s website (look for 
“Contact Us” pages or information 
in the Footer, or finally, a Google 
search of “Brand X Headquarters” 
and resulting sites. 
 
Example: Patagonia is 











0 = TRADITIONAL 
A non-traditional brand is defined as 
one whose core mission or 
foundational goal is to remedy a 
social or environmental issue. This 
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126 1 = NON-TRADITIONAL 
 
can be supported by evidence in the 
brand’s informational pages or 
impact reports. Even if a traditional 
brand has done substantial social 
impact or environmental work, this 


















Definition: On the brand’s website (not their 
parent company’s or partner retailer’s), this 
variable indicates if there is a page or 
section that mentions their engagement in 
relation to sustainability, fair wages, 
corporate responsibility, charitable giving, 




0 = NO 
1 = YES  
. = MISSING CURRENT WEBSITE 
Find the brand website and explore 
all pages for this information. 
 
Example: Nike has “Sustainability” 
and “Purpose” pages linked in their 








Definition: The URL of the main home page 
of the brand’s website. 
 
. = MISSING 
Link can be found in several ways, 
including searching for the brand on 
Google or searching for their 
















Definition: The year that the brand was 
founded/incorporated/started selling 
products. The definition is flexible since 




. = MISSING 
This year can be found in several 
ways, starting with the Reference 
USA/Orbis database, LinkedIn 
profiles, the brand website, 
Wikipedia, and finally, a general 
Google search. 
 











Definition: If the brand went out of business 
or ceased to exist between the research 




0 = OPERATING BRAND  
1 = CEASED BRAND 
 
SKIP LOGIC: 
IF 0, SKIP TO PRODUCTS 
IF 1, COMPLETE YEAR_END 
 
 
Indications of a brand having gone 
out of business include: the website 
being down/expired (but further 
validation should be found), a lack 
of information in ReferenceUSA, or 
Orbis (there are not recent years on 
record), and a general search of “did 
Brand X go out of business.”  
Indications of a brand still being in 
business include their website fully 
operational, updated, and recent 
information on business databases. 
 
Example: Teeki went out of business 
in 2019 and is coded as “1.” 
   
 













Definition: The last year of operation for the 
brand if it has gone out of business. If still in 








Nexis Uni or other business-related 
publications (Forbes, BusinessWire, 
etc.) are reliable sources for this 
information. Also, if it is known that 
a company went out of business, the 
last year of information in the 
Reference USA/Orbis profile will 
suffice. 
 
Example: Teeki went out of business 












































Definition: A list of all types of products 
sold by the brand, from these categories: 







12000 -Apparel, Footwear 
 
12345 -Apparel, Footwear, Swimwear, 
Intimates, Accessories/Other 
 
12350 -Apparel, Footwear, Swimwear, 
Accessories/Other 
 
12400 -Apparel, Footwear, Intimates 
 
12450 -Apparel, Footwear, Intimates, 
Accessories/Other 
 
12500 -Apparel, Footwear, 
Accessories/Other 
 
13000 -Apparel, Swimwear 
 
13400 -Apparel, Swimwear, Intimates 
 
13450 -Apparel, Swimwear, Intimates, 
Accessories/Other 
 
13500 -Apparel, Swimwear, 
Accessories/Other 
 
14000 -Apparel, Intimates 
 
14500 -Apparel, Intimates, 
Accessories/Other 
 
15000 -Apparel, Accessories/Other 
Browse the shopping pages of the 
brand website to see what product 
types they sell. 
 
Example: Toms Shoes sells 
Footwear and Accessories/Other. 
(25000) 
 
   
 




























24000- Footwear, Intimates 
 




34500 -Swimwear, Intimates, 
Accessories/Other 
 

















Definition: The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic 
has resulted in cloth face masks becoming a 
requirement for public outings. Many 
apparel brands have repurposed their 
manufacturing lines to sell these masks. 
 
CODE: 
0 = NO 
1 = YES 
Browse the shopping pages of the 
brand website or search to see if 
they are selling face masks 
(responses as of June 2020). 
 
Example: Botanica Workshop LLC 
















Definition: The sex or sexes of the founder 
of the brand. If a man founded the company, 
code as “male,” if a woman founded it, 
“female,” and if more than one sex is 
represented in the founding body, “both.” 
 
CODE: 
0 = FEMALE 
1 = MALE  
2 = BOTH  
. = MISSING  
Process: The founder of a brand can 
be found in several ways, starting 
with the brand website, which often 
has this information on an “About 
Us” or similar page. If not found 
there, search “Brand X founder” on 
Google. 
 
Example: Rothy’s was founded by 
Stephen Hawthornthwaite and Roth 











Definition: The sex of the consumer 
demographic targeted by the brand, based on 
the product types they offer. 
 
CODE: 
0 = FEMALE  
1 = MALE  
2 = BOTH 
Browse the shopping pages of the 
brand website to see what general 
sex they sell to. 
 
Example: Nike’s website has “Men” 
and “Women” sections to shop from 







Definition: The age group of the consumer 
demographic targeted by the brand, based on 
the products they offer.  
 
Browse the shopping pages of the 
brand website to see what age group 
they sell to. 
 
   
 








0 = ADULT  
1 = TEENAGER  
2 = CHILD/INFANT  
3 = TWO OR MORE  
Example: Nike’s website has 
“Men,” “Women,” and “Kids” 
sections to shop from, and is thus 






















Definition: The channel by which the brand 
sells its products. ECommerce being online 
sales through a direct brand website; a 
name-brand store front meaning that they 
have a brick-and-mortar location (not a 
retailer); and wholesaler meaning that they 
sell their product to sold by other merchants, 
sometimes re-branded. Many brands sell 
through one or more of these channels, so all 




1-Namebrand Storefront only 
2-Wholesale Only 
3-eCommerce & Wholesale 
4-eCommerce & Storefront 
5-Wholesale & Storefront 
6-All three 
This information can be found in 
several ways, the first being the 
brand website. Many brands have a 
“Store locator” which may offer the 
evidence of a name brand storefront, 
or partner retailers, indicating 
wholesale. If the brand site offers 
transactions on their products, we 
have evidence of eCommerce. If 
store locations or partners are not 
found on the website, a Google 
search for the brand will result in 
other places to purchase their 
products, indicating the sales 
channel. 
 
Example: Dolls Kill sells online and 
has a flagship storefront, but does 
not sell wholesale, so it is coded as 











Definition: If the brand is an owned 
subsidiary of a parent company. This does 
not include licensing.  
 
CODE: 
0 = NO PARENT COMPANY 
1 = PARENT COMPANY  
. = MISSING 
 
SKIP LOGIC: 
IF 0, SKIP TO PUBLIC 
IF 1, GO TO PARENTCO_NAME 
Process: To determine if a brand is 
owned by a parent company or 
incorporation, Reference USA 
should list it under the field: “Parent 
Company.” This can also be found 
by searching the brand website for a 
“Corporate” page, or searching 
Google for “Brand X parent 
company” or “who owns Brand X.” 
 
Example: Timberland is owned by 













Definition: The parent company that owns 
the brand or the brands’ owner. This field 
should indicate the highest level of 
ownership, but not individual names of 




0 = N/A 
To determine the parent company or 
incorporation above a brand name, 
Reference USA should list it under 
the field: “Parent Company.” This 
can also be found by searching the 
brand website for a “Corporate” 
page, or searching Google for 
“Brand X parent company” or “who 
owns Brand X.” 
 
Timberland is owned by VF 
Corporation, so VF Corporation is 
listed. VF Corporation is not a 
subsidiary of any other company. 
   
 


















Definition: Acquisition indicates if a brand 
was bought by its parent company (this is 
different from a parent company creating a 
brand, such as Gap Inc. creating and owning 
Gap Kids). If the brand was acquired, record 
the year of the deal. If the brand was created 
by a parent company, this does not apply. 
 
CODE: 
0 = N/A 
. = MISSING 
 
MEAN: 2012 
RANGE:  1973 - 2020 
This information can be found in 
several ways. Searching on Nexis 
Uni or Google for the brand name 
and “acquisition,” “acquired,” 
“bought,” or “sold” are good to start. 
Business publications are the 
preferred sources. Wikipedia is also 
accepted.  
 
Example: Dolfin was bought by GK 
Elite Sportswear from Jade 
Swimwear in 2016. The field should 


























Definition: The country where the brand’s 
parent company was founded, is currently 
incorporated, and is headquartered. Most 
often, these are all the same country. If there 
are discrepancies, the company’s main 
headquarters are used as the determining 
location. The input field has a validated 

















IF NOT USA, SKIP TO 
PARENTCO_PRIOR 
IF USA, GO TO PARENTCO_STATE 
This information can be found in 
multiple places, including: the 
parent company’s LinkedIn profile 
(if location is mentioned), the parent 
company’s website (look for 
“Contact Us” pages or information 
in the Footer, or finally, a Google 
search of “Company X 
Headquarters” and resulting sites. 
 
Example: 7 For All Mankind is a 
United States owned and operated 
brand, but the parent company is 
headquartered in Israel. 
 

















If PARENTCO_COUNTRY is USA, find 
the state in the United States where the 
brand’s parent company was founded, is 
currently incorporated, and is headquartered. 
Most often, these are all the same location. 
If there are discrepancies, the company’s 
main headquarters are used as the 
determining location. The input field has a 
validated drop-down list as sourced from a 
list of all states. 
 
This information can be found in 
multiple places, including: the 
parent company’s LinkedIn profile 
(if location is mentioned), the parent 
company’s website (look for 
“Contact Us” pages or information 
in the Footer, or finally, a Google 
search of “Company X 
Headquarters” and resulting sites. 
 
   
 
































0 = N/A 
















31, New Jersey 
33, New York 









Gap brands are owned by Gap Inc., 
which is in California. 
 
















Definition: Acquisition indicates if a brand 
was bought by its parent company. If the 
brand was acquired, who was the original 
owner? If the brand was created by a parent 
company, leave this field blank.  
 
CODE: 
0 = N/A 
This information can be found in 
several ways. Searching on Nexis 
Uni or Google for the brand name 
and “acquisition,” “acquired,” 
“bought,” or “sold” are good to start. 
Business publications are the 
preferred sources. Wikipedia is also 
accepted. 
 
Dolfin was bought by GK Elite 
Sportswear from Jade Swimwear in 
2016. The field should be entered 










Definition: If the brand or its parent 
company or portfolio is publicly traded on 
any stock market. 
 
CODE: 
0 = NOT PUBLICLY TRADED 
1 = PUBLICLY TRADED 
Bloomberg and stock exchange 
websites are good to search for the 
brand or parent company and their 
stock account. LinkedIn and 
Reference USA/Orbis will list if a 
brand is public or private, although 
this should be double checked 
through a Google or stock search. 
 
   
 
 68  
 
Example: Lee Jeans is owned by 
Kontoor Brands which is publicly 
traded as KTB on the NYSE. It is 












Definition: The year that the owning parent 
company or brand (if it’s independently 
owned) went public on a stock exchange. 
(IPO=initial public offering). 
 
CODE: 
0 = N/A 
. = MISSING 
 
MEDIAN: 1991 
RANGE: 1920 - 2016 
Bloomberg and stock exchange 
websites are good to search for the 
brand or parent company and their 
stock account. LinkedIn and 
Reference USA/Orbis will list if a 
brand is public or private, although 
this should be double checked 
through a Google or stock search of 
“Company X IPO” 
 
Example: Lee Jeans is owned by 
Kontoor Brands which became 








Definition: The most recently available 
revenue/sales (not net profit or another 
detailed accounting item) of the brand (not 
parent company), in US Dollars. 
 
CODE: 
. = MISSING 
 
MEDIAN: $5,000,000 




Process: ReferenceUSA or Orbis 
company profile will list the revenue 
and the year that the information 
was last updated or validated. If the 
brand is not listed in these databases, 
a Google search of “Brand X 
revenue” will yield sites like Owler, 
ZoomInfo, Bloomberg, and other 
sites that may provide the 
information. 
 
Example: Bog’s Footwear’s latest 











Definition: The year that the last known 
revenue was recorded from. 
 
CODE: 





Process: ReferenceUSA or Orbis 
company profile will list the revenue 
and the year that the information 
was last updated or validated. If the 
brand is not listed in these databases, 
a Google search of “Brand X 
revenue” will yield sites like Owler, 
ZoomInfo, Bloomberg, Dunn & 
Bradstreet, and other sites that may 
provide the information. 
 
Example: Bog’s Footwear’s latest 












Definition: The number of employees 
working for the brand (not the parent 
company). This is represented as a range 




1-10 to 24 
2-25 to 49 
LinkedIn, ReferenceUSA, or Orbis 
are the best places to find this 
information quickly and reliably. If 
it is not offered or seems suspicious 
(ex: a large company says there are 
less than 10 employees), then search 
for alternative sources on the brand 
website or business press. 
 
   
 








3-50 to 99 
4-100 to 499 
5-500 to 999 
6-1000-4999 
7-5000+ 
. = MISSING 
Example: Rothy's lists 1001-5000 
employees on their LinkedIn profile, 












Definition: The counted number of countries 
that the brand manufactures in (and can be 
accounted for online).  
 
CODE: 




Process: Formula to count the 
number of manufacturing countries 












































Definition: Whether the brand AND/OR 
their parent company manufactures in the 
country of the variable. This includes 
sourcing their products, operating factories, 
or sourcing materials.  
 
CODE: 
0=No manufacturing in country 
















188, Costa Rica 
191, Croatia 
218, Ecuador 









344, Hong Kong 
First search the brand or parent 
company website for annual reports, 
manufacturing partners, phrases like 
“fine Italian leather” to discover 
which countries participate in the 
sourcing or manufacturing. If 
information from the brand is 
unavailable, search the web for any 
mention of their processes. 
 
The maximum number of countries 
for one brand was 41. 
 
The total number of countries 
mentioned is 63, and that is the 
number of manufacturing country 
variables in the dataset. 
   
 





















































































Definition: NAICS stands for North 
American Industry Classification System 
and identifies the industry of the brand. 
They are 6 digits and the full codebook is 
available from the Census website. Up to 6 
NAICS codes are recorded per brand 
 
CODE: 
. = MISSING 
ReferenceUSA, ZoomInfo, or Orbis 
are the best places to find this 
information quickly and reliably. If 
it is not offered or seems suspicious 
(ex: a shoe company’s NAICS code 
is for animal agriculture), then 
search for alternative sources. 
 
Example: Allbirds, Inc. Primary 
NAICS code is 448210, which 
represents Shoe Stores. The 
description for each code is matched 
from the directory. Its second 
NAICS code is 316210, which is 
Footwear Manufacturing. 
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APPENDIX 3. WEBSITE ARCHIVAL 
Collection Protocol for Website Archives 
Note: 
Earlier years (2005-2010) have issues with Javascript where the site is inaccessible. Also, the 
Wayback Machine does not crawl every site, every year, so there will be missing data at random. 
Process: 
1. Access Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine at https://archive.org/ 
2. In the search bar, enter the homepage website link from Brand Data Collection. 
a. Example: https://www.cotopaxi.com 
3. Find the correct website and click 
a. This involves making sure it is not the corporate iteration of a brand website 
(example: http://www.patagoniaworks.com/ vs. www.patagonia.com) 
4. Using the timeline at the top of the webpage, starting with 2005, visit the earliest year 
available for the brand. 
a. Then select the first available archive from the mid-year (around June) 
5. Explore the website within the Wayback Machine to look for any language describing the 
brand’s mission, values, “about us,” “history,” “story,” “our process,” sustainability, 
social responsibility, CA Transparency Act, and charitable giving. 
a. If these topics cannot be found in any capacity on the website, download the main 
home page or brand page only. 
b. If a brand website links to their parent company’s website, then download only 
the linked pages. 
6. For any page within the website that contains these target topics, download a pdf file of 
the page by: 
a. Pressing Command/Control P or selecting “Print Page” from your browser 
b. Save As PDF by these 2 options: 
i. Expanding options/settings and click “Open PDF in Preview” and Save 
ii. Change Printer Location to Save as PDF and Save 
7. Name the file using this NUMERICAL naming system 
a. YEAR. BRAND_ID. MONTH. DOWNLOAD_COUNT. BRAND_ID 
b. YEAR is 4 digits, BRAND_ID is 3 digits, MONTH & DOWNLOAD COUNT 
are 2 digits 
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Table 3.1: Coder Summary Statistics of Website Downloads 
Statistic N= Coder 1  Coder 2 
Total Downloads 7409 4925 2484 
Mean Downloads/Brand 15 16 13 
Median Downloads/Brand 10 10 10 
Minimum Downloads/Brand 0 0 0 
Maximum Downloads/Brand 189 188 189 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Website Downloads by Year 
Year Count of Downloads Percentage of Sample 
2005 140 1.89% 
2006 183 2.47% 
2007 193 2.60% 
2008 219 2.96% 
2009 229 3.09% 
2010 275 3.71% 
2011 342 4.62% 
2012 475 6.41% 
2013 566 7.64% 
2014 628 8.48% 
2015 652 8.80% 
2016 662 8.94% 
2017 659 8.89% 
2018 601 8.11% 
2019 658 8.88% 
2020 927 12.51% 





   
 
 73  
 
REFERENCES 
Aldrich, Howard E., Marlene Fiol. (1994). Fools Rush in? The Institutional Context of Industry 
Creation. Academy of Management Review. 19:4, 645-670.  
Aldrich, Howard E., Ruef, Martin and Lippmann, Stephen. (2020). Organizations Evolving, 
Third Edition. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.  
Arora, Sanjay K., Yin Li, Jan Youtie, Philip Shapira. (2016). Using the wayback machine to 
mine websites in the social sciences: A methodological resource. Journal of the 
Association for Information Science and Technology. 67: 8, 1904-1915. 
https://asistdl.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/asi.23503 
Bajaj, Vikas. (2012). “Bangladesh Fire Kills More than 100 and Injuries.” New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-kills-more-than-100-
and-injures-many.html 
Barnett, M. L., Henriques, I., & Husted, B. W. (2020). Beyond Good Intentions: Designing CSR 
Initiatives for Greater Social Impact. Journal of Management, 46(6), 937–964. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206319900539 
Bartley, Tim, and Egels-Zandén, Niklas. (2016). Beyond decoupling: unions and the leveraging 
of corporate social responsibility in Indonesia, Socio-Economic Review, Volume 14, 
Issue 2, Pages 231–255, https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwv023 
Bartley, Tim, and Curtis Child. (2014). “Shaming the Corporation: The Social Production of 
Targets and the Anti-Sweatshop Movement.” American Sociological Review 79(4):653–
79. 
Bartley, Tim, and Curtis Child. (2011). “Movements, Markets and Fields: The Effects of Anti-
Sweatshop Campaigns on U.S. Firms, 1993-2000.” Social Forces 90(2):425–51. 
Brad, A., Delemare, A., Hurley, N., Lenikus, V., Mulrenan, R., Nemes, N., Trunk, U., and 




B Corporation. (2020). Related Entities. B Corporation. 
https://bcorporation.net/certification/related-entities 
California Department of Industrial Relations. (2019). “Garment worker wage claim / AB 633.” 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Garment_worker_wage_claim.html 
Carroll, Glenn R. (1984). Organizational Ecology. Annual Review of Sociology. 10:71-93. 
Carroll, Glenn R. (1993). A sociological view on why firms differ. Strategic Management 
Journal. 14:4. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250140402 
   
 
 74  
 
Carroll, Glenn R. (1997). Long-term Evolutionary Change in Organizational Populations: 
Theory, Models and Empirical Findings in Industrial Demography, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 119–143, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/6.1.119 
Chae, Bongsug and Eunhye Park. (2018). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): A Survey of 
Topics and Trends Using Twitter Data and Topic Modeling. Sustainability. 10(7), 2231. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072231 
Chandler, D. (2016). Strategic corporate social responsibility: sustainable value creation. United 
States of America: SAGE Publications.  
Chandler, D., & Werther, W. B. (2013). Strategic corporate social responsibility: stakeholders, 
globalization, and sustainable value creation (3rd ed.). United States of America: SAGE 
Publications. 
Deephouse, David L. (1996). “Does Isomorphism Legitimate?” Academy of Management 
Journal 39.4: 1024–1039. 
DesJardine, Mark R., Emilio Marti, and Rodolphe Durand. (2020). Why Activist Hedge Funds 
Target Socially Responsible Firms: The Reaction Costs of Signaling Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2019.0238 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. (1983). “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American 
Sociological Review 48: 147–160. 
Dowling, John, and Jeffrey Pfeffer. (1975) “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and 
Organizational Behavior.” Pacific Sociological Review 18.1: 122–136. 
Ebrahim, A., & Rangan, V. K. (2014). What Impact? A Framework for Measuring the Scale and 
Scope of Social Performance. California Management Review, 56(3), 118–141. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2014.56.3.118 
Elkington, John. (1994). Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business 
Strategies for Sustainable Development. California Management Review.  
Fairtrade America. (2020). “Fairtrade Clothing and Textiles.” 
https://www.fairtradeamerica.org/shop-fairtrade/fairtrade-products/clothing-textiles/  
Federal Trade Commission. (2020). “Threading your way through the labeling requirements 
under the textile and wool acts.” https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/threading-your-way-through-labeling-requirements-under-textile 
Federal Trade Commission. (2012). Federal Register Notices: Guides for the Use of 
Environmental Marketing Claims. 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/guides-use 
environmental-marketing-claims-green-guides/greenguidesfrn.pdf 
   
 
 75  
 
Giridharadas, Anand. (2018). Winners take all: The elite charade of changing the world. 
Girschik, Verena. (2019). “Managing Legitimacy in Business‐Driven Social Change: The Role 
of Relational Work” Journal of Management Studies. 
Gehman, Joel, Matthew G. Grimes, and Ke Cao. (2018). Why We Care about Certified B 
Corporations. Academy of Management Discoveries. 5(1); 97-101 
Glen, Stephanie. (2014). "Cohen’s Kappa Statistic" From StatisticsHowTo.com: Elementary 
Statistics for the rest of us! https://www.statisticshowto.com/cohens-kappa-statistic/ 
Granados, Maria L. and Rosli, Ainurul. (2019) ‘Fitting In’ vs. ‘Standing Out’: How Social 
Enterprises Engage with Stakeholders to Legitimize their Hybrid Position. Journal of 
Social Entrepreneurship 0:0, pages 1-20. 
Grimes, Matthew G., Joel Gehman, and Ke Cao. (2018). “Positively Deviant: Identity Work 
through B Corporation Certification.” Journal of Business Venturing 33(2):130–48. 
Harris, D. Kamala. (2015). California Transparency in Supply Chains Act Resource Guide. 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf 
Henderson, Rebecca. (2020). Reimagining Capitalism in a World on Fire. Public Affairs. 
Hoeffler, Steve, and Kevin Lane Keller. (2002). “Building Brand Equity Through Corporate 
Societal Marketing.” Semantic Scholar. 
Horrigan, Bryan. (2008). 21st Century Corporate Social Responsibility Trends - An Emerging 
Comparative Body of Law and Regulation on Corporate Responsibility, Governance, and 
Sustainability. Macquarie Journal of Business Law. 4. 
Hustvedt, Gwendolyn, and John C. Bernard. (2010). “Effects of Social Responsibility Labelling 
and Brand on Willingness to Pay for Apparel.” International Journal of Consumer 
Studies 34(6):619–26. 
Islam, M. A., and K. McPhail. (2011). “Regulating for Corporate Human Rights Abuses: The 
Emergence of Corporate Reporting on the ILO’s Human Rights Standards within the 
Global Garment Manufacturing and Retail Industry.” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
22.8:790–810. 
Joutsenvirta, Maria, and Eero Vaara. (2009). “Discursive (De)Legitimation of a Contested 
Finnish Greenfield Investment Project in Latin America.” Scandinavian Journal of 
Management 25.1: 85–96. 
Kozlowski, Anika, Cory Searcy, Michal Bardecki. (2015). Corporate sustainability reporting in 
the apparel industry: An analysis of indicators disclosed. International Journal of 
Productivity and Performance Management. 64(3): 377-397. 
Kuckartz, U. (2014). Qualitative text analysis: A guide to methods, practice & using software. 
London, : SAGE Publications Ltd doi: 10.4135/9781446288719 
   
 
 76  
 
Latapi Agudelo, Mauricio Andres, Lara Johannsdottir, and Brynhildur Davidsdottir. (2019). A 
literature review of the history and evolution of corporate social responsibility. 
International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility. 4:1.  
Lounsbury, Michael. (2001). “Institutional Sources of Practice Variation: Staffing College and 
University Recycling Programs.” Administrative Science Quarterly 46.1: 29–56.  
Lounsbury, Michael and Mary Ann Glynn. (2001). Cultural Entrepreneurship: Stories, 
Legitimacy and the Acquisition of Resources. Strategic Management Journal. 22: 545-
64.  
Lounsbury, Michael and Brandon Lee. (2004). The Origins of Social Entrepreneurship. Working 
Paper, Dept. Of Sociology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University.  
Lounsbury, Michael, David Strang. (2009). Social Entrepreneurship: Success Stories and Logic 
Construction. In Steven Heydemann and David Hammack (Eds.) Globaliztaion, 
Philanthrophy, and Civil Society: Projecting Institutional Logics Abroad. Pp 71-94. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Lounsbury, Michael and Eric Zhao. (2013). “Neo-institutional Theory.” obo in Management. 
doi: 10.1093/obo/9780199846740-0053 
Marquis, Christopher, Mary Ann Glynn, and Gerald F. Davis. (2007). “Community Isomorphism 
and Corporate Social Action.” Academy of Management Review 32.3: 925–945. 
McDonnell, Mary-Hunter, Brayden G. King, and Sarah A. Soule. (2015). “A Dynamic Process 
Model of Private Politics: Activist Targeting and Corporate Receptivity to Social 
Challenges.” American Sociological Review 80(3):654–78. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. (1977). “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83: 340–363. 
Morgan, A., Ross, M., Siegle, L., McCartney, S., Firth, L., Shiva, V., Blickenstaff, D., ... Life Is 
My Movie Entertainment (Firm),. (2015). The true cost. 
Nadkarni, Sucheta and V.K. Narayanan. (2007). Strategic schemas, strategic flexibility, and firm 
performance: the moderating role of industry clockspeed. Strategic Management Journal. 
(8):3 
National Museum of American History. (1998). “Sweatshops in America.” 
https://americanhistory.si.edu/sweatshops/history-1940-1997  
New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health. (2011). Lessons from the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Factory Fire. https://www.osha.gov/oas/NYCOSH_Triangle_Jounal.pdf 
Nexis Uni. (2020). “Results for: Apparel Sweatshop Protest.” https://advance-lexis-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/api/permalink/a997c752-30be-45f2-b76d-
2f1ff3906f5d/?context=1516831 
   
 
 77  
 
Nicholls, A. (2010). The Legitimacy of Social Entrepreneurship: Reflexive Isomorphism in a 
Pre–Paradigmatic Field. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), 611–633. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00397.x 
Ntim, Collins G., Soobaroven, Teerooven. (2013). “Corporate Governance and Performance in 
Socially Responsible Corporations: New Empirical Insights from a Neo‐Institutional 
Framework.” Corporate Governance, 21 (5): 468-494. https://doi-
org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1111/corg.12026 
Nyilasy, G., Gangadharbatla, H., & Paladino, A. (2012). Greenwashing: A Consumer 
Perspective. Economics & Sociology, 5(2), 116-123,153-154.  
OSHA. (2011). Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire. https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha/40-
years/trianglefactoryfire 
Park, Kendall Cox. (2018). “Understanding Ethical Consumers: Willingness-to-Pay by Moral 
Cause.” Journal of Consumer Marketing 35(2):157–68. 
Rainie, Lee and Andrew Perrin. (2019). Key findings about Americans’ declining trust in 
government and each other. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/07/22/key-findings-about-americans-declining-trust-in-government-and-each-
other/ 
Rao, Hayagreeva. (1994). “The Social Construction of Reputation: Certification Contests, 
Legitimation, and the Survival of Organizations in the American Automobile Industry; 
1895–1912.” In Supplement: Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage. 
Strategic Management Journal 15.S1: 29–44. 
Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2006). “Corporate social responsibility: A trend and a movement, but of 
what and for what?” Corporate Governance, 6(5), 595-608. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1108/14720700610706081 
Schons, Laura and Maria Steinmeier. (2015). Walk the Talk? How Symbolic and Substantive 
CSR Actions Affect Firm Performance Depending on Stakeholder Proximity, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 23(6). https://doi-
org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1002/csr.1381 
Scott, W. Richard. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. 3d ed. London: 
SAGE,  
Sharkey, Amanda J., and Patricia Bromley. (2015). “Can Ratings Have Indirect Effects? 
Evidence from the Organizational Response to Peers’ Environmental Ratings.” American 
Sociological Review 80(1):63–91. 
Social Enterprise Alliance. (2018). “What is a Social Enterprise?” Social Enterprise Alliance. 
https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/ 
   
 
 78  
 
Sparviero, Sergio. (2019). “The Case for a Socially Oriented Business Model Canvas: The Social 
Enterprise Model Canvas: Journal of Social Entrepreneurship: Vol 10, No 2.” 
(https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19420676.2018.1541011?src=recsys&). 
Suchman, Mark C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. The 
Academy of Management Review. 20(3): 571-610.  
Suddaby, R., Seidl, D., & Lê, J. K. (2013). Strategy-as-practice meets neo-institutional theory. 
Strategic Organization, 11(3), 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127013497618 
Sustainable Apparel Coalition. (2021). “The SAC.” https://apparelcoalition.org/the-sac/ 
Sutton, John R., Frank Dobbin, John W. Meyer, and W. Richard Scott. (1994). “The Legalization 
of the Workplace.” American Journal of Sociology 99.4: 944–971. 
TIPP. (1996). “Annual Report.” https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/tipp4.htm 
Toms. (2019). “Blake’s Bio.” Toms. https://www.toms.com/blakes-bio 
United Nations. (2015). “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for
%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf  
United Nations. (2018). “Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action.” 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Industry%20Charter%20%20Fashion%20an
d%20Climate%20Action%20-%2022102018.pdf 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2019). "Table 7. Survival of private sector establishments by 
opening year." https://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_00_table7.txt 
Vaara, E., & Tienari, J. (2008). “A Discursive Perspective on Legitimation Strategies in 
Multinational Corporations.” The Academy of Management Review, 33(4), 985-993.  
Vasi, Ion Bogdan, and Brayden G. King. (2012). “Social Movements, Risk Perceptions, and 
Economic Outcomes: The Effect of Primary and Secondary Stakeholder Activism on 
Firms’ Perceived Environmental Risk and Financial Performance.” American 
Sociological Review 77(4):573–96. 
White, Candace L., Anne Ellerup Nielsen, and Chiara Valentini. (2017). “CSR Research in the 
Apparel Industry: A Quantitative and Qualitative Review of Existing Literature.” 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 24(5):382–94. 
Wikipedia. (2018). Category: Clothing brands of the United States. Wikipedia. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Category:Clothing_brands_of_the_United_Sta
tes&oldid=874501952 
World Bank. (2019).“How Much Do Our Wardrobes Cost to the Environment?” The World 
Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/09/23/costo-moda-medio-
ambiente 
